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1. Prologue 
 When we hear about a secular country, we immediately imagine a country 
that is modern, tolerant and accepting every ethnic or religious group without any 
discrimination. In that country, we can see people with different lifestyles, 
nationalities or even from different religions coexisting peacefully. State officials also 
don’t develop policies that favor any particular group; all citizens are equal before 
the law and have the exact same treatment. Fine examples of such countries are 
Western European countries like Germany and the United Kingdom. On the contrary, 
when we discuss an Islamic country, in other words a country where the official and 
accepted lifestyle is the Islamic one, then immediately we imagine a country whose 
society is intolerant and doesn’t accept a different lifestyle except the Islamic one, 
where the Saria Law is everything. Of course, in these states, women have no rights 
and are like men’ possession.  
 Turkey though is a different case, almost unique. There the official religion is 
Islam but is a completely different country that has no relation with Islamic countries 
like Iran or Pakistan. For ages people, including women, dress modernly, women are 
free to follow a profession, don’t have to obey their men and can dress in the way 
they want and their rights are respected in general. In addition, Turkey participates 
in the Eurovision singing contest and their women participate in worldwide beauty 
contests. In other words, at a first glance, it looks like Turkey is a modern country 
similar to the Western ones. The Western World too believed that Turkey is different 
than the other countries where the official state religion is Islam. 
 This difference is thanks to one man, Mustafa Kemal, the one known as 
Ataturk. After the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, he became the 
dominant man in the Turkish political scene and proceeded to reform Turkey 
according to his visions. His reforms transformed the country completely, making it a 
secular one, where religion is less important and even suppressed and where 
modernity similar to the Western World is the ideal example to follow.  
 The big question here though is if these changes got accepted by the 
population. Did Turkish society accept secularizing reforms or is there a part of the 
society that feels that their rights are repressed and that they cannot live according 
to the way the wish? In other words, did a part of the society feel alienated by these 
changes, felt repressed and wanted to organize politically and change what they feel 
is wrong by Islamizing the society?  
 The answer to this question is that yes, some people in Turkey got mobilized 
and gave rise to the Political Islam, wanting to increase the importance of the Islamic 
religion in Turkish society. Various Islamic Parties have appeared, starting from 1960 
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but they always failed to bring the changes they wanted in the society. Always, due 
to interference from military officers and the Kemalist establishment, Islamic parties 
got banned and dissolved because Kemalists were afraid of their increasing influence 
that would possibly undermine secularism in Turkey and change the form of the 
state that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk created.  
 The last 15 years, a new political party appeared in Turkish political field: The 
Justice and Development Party, which was founded by former Political Islam 
supporters. Its officials claimed that they are moderate and they don’t want to 
undermine secularism but to correct it, by creating a state where both the pious and 
the less pious and even the atheists can coexist. In other words, they just wanted to 
stop the repression of the more conservative and pious part of the society. Their 
policies follow that direction but, at the same time, AKP politicians state that 
Islamization of the society, which is contrary to what Kemal Ataturk wanted for 
Turkey, isn’t a part of their agenda. Nevertheless, the secular part of the society feel 
threatened by AKP policies and accuse them that they want to make Turkey an 
Islamic state, where the society would be Islamic. Is it so?  
 The goal of this current research is to try to give an answer to this question. 
Does Recep Tayip Erdogan, Turkey’s powerful man, have an Islamization agenda? Is 
the Turkish society changing towards an Islamic one? In order to answer to this 
question, first, in the first chapter of this dissertation, how the Ottoman Empire 
transformed into a secular state is explained. What happened, what were the 
reforms and, most importantly, what was Ataturk’s way of thinking that resulted in 
these major changes. In the latter parts, how Political Islam appeared and the 
political events that followed and gave rise to the Justice and Development Party are 
analyzed. In other words, the approach is a historic one, as the focus is on explaining 
how and why the Turkish society voted for Islamic actors. In the last part, the focus is 
on Erdogan, Turkey’s current President, and his policies. Justice and Development 
Party’s policies are reviewed regarding the religion and whether there is an 
Islamization policy of the society is the real objective. Some of the topics that are 
assessed are if they try to impose the Islamic lifestyle on the Turkish population in 
general, their education policy and if there are changes in the education system that 
aim to make the children conservative Muslims, the government’s stance towards 
the Diyanet, which is the state institution that administers mosques, informs society 
about Islam and is responsible for Islamic education and AKP’s stance towards the 
Alevis, which is the largest religious group in Turkey. If government officials 
acknowledge Alevis’ rights and formulated policies that integrate them into the 
society, then that means that AKP kept their word and have started to deliver a 
secular, tolerant society. By assessing the topics above, an answer will be given 
about secularism, if it withdraws and if AKP and Erdogan attempt to Islamize the 
society in general. 
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2. Transformation of the Ottoman Empire into 
modern Turkey 
a. Historical development 
 The great leading and military skills of Mustafa Kemal, who would be later 
named Ataturk, resulted in the military victory of August- September 1922. As a 
result, he had been granted the title of Gazi and he was the dominant one in the 
political game. (ZÜRCHER, 2010 , p. 143), (ZÜRCHER, 2004, p. 229) With the end of 
war with the Greeks and Western Allies out of the way two political forces remained 
in Turkey: Grand National Assembly, which had a nationalist character and was 
enjoying people’s support due to military victories and the Sultan. (LEWIS, 2001, p. 
257) These two dominant forces’ final clash started when the Allied forces, who still 
recognized Sultan’s regime in Istanbul, invited both of them to the Lausanne peace 
conference.  This twofold invitation worried Mustafa Kemal because it could lead to 
a divided Turkish authority, something that he really wished to avoid. This is why he 
decided to get rid of the throne and the political power held by the Sultan. Of 
course, this wasn’t an easy task because many, some of them being Kemal’s closest 
associates, were still loyal to the Sultanate. Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal has 
reached his decision: The sultanate had to be abolished and the Sultanate and the 
Caliphate had to be separated. According to his vision, there would be no Sultan, just 
an Ottoman prince that he would hold the title of Caliph with religious and no 
political powers. His aim was twofold: On the one hand the personal autocracy of 
the Sultan would end and on the other hand the opposition would be disarmed and 
he would remain the dominant one in the political life of Turkey. (LEWIS, 2001, pp. 
257-258)  
 On 31 of October Kemal put his proposals to a meeting of the association for 
the Defense of Rights. The following day they were submitted to the Grand National 
Assembly. Long and heated discussions took place. At first, many Assembly members 
objected to the revolutionary changes that Kemal proposed and raised all kinds of 
legal and theological questions. Those who disagreed with the radical changes that 
Kemal Ataturk proposed couldn’t even think about an alternative to a constitutional 
monarchy under the Ottoman dynasty, a tradition that lasted for around 500 years. 
But some of those conservatives voted for the abolition of the Sultanate and they 
agreed because they assumed that the caliph would remain the spiritual leader and 
president of the assembly, in essence remain the one in power. Also, they believed 
that he would make sure that the holy laws and principles of sharia, which is the 
legal code of Islam, would not be violated. Kemal Ataturk defended, explained his 
views and argued in favor of them and in the end he managed to dominate the 
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assembly. Grand National Assembly decided for the abolition of the Caliphate. 
(Lewis, 1974, p. 88), (LEWIS, 2001, p. 258), (Ahmad, 1993, p. 52) 
 The resolution that passed on 1 November 1922 contains two articles. 
According to the first article, the form of government in Istanbul resting on the 
sovereignty of an individual has ceased to exist and passed into history. The second 
article recognized that the Caliphate belonged to the Ottoman house but made clear 
that the former rested on the Turkish state and that the Caliph would be chosen 
among the members of the Ottoman house by the National Grand Assembly. (LEWIS, 
2001, p. 259) Mehmet VI Vahideddin, the last Sultan, didn’t wait for the Assembly’s 
final decision. On 17 November he had slipped out of the palace, boarded a British 
warship and fled to Malta. Because of this development, Grand National Assembly 
declared him deposed and elected his cousin, Abdulmecid, as Caliph. (LEWIS, 2001, 
p. 259) 
 Mustafa Kemal in 6 December 1922 announced to the press the creation of a 
new party, its name was People’s Party and invited intellectuals and educated 
people to exchange opinions about the new country. (LEWIS, 2001, p. 259) This party 
was the only one active inside the Grand National Assembly but there were some 
other groups and people that they didn’t belong to it. (Lewis, 1974, p. 89) Those who 
supported Kemal and shared his ideas were a minority in the Assembly in 1923. 
However, the prestige that Kemal held at the time because of his great victories gave 
the “Kemalists” a great advantage. When he and his supporters understood that 
their political opponents inside the Assembly, mainly Islamists and liberal 
Westerners, were trying to persuade the other members to restore the Sultanate in 
a new form they acted quickly and had the Assembly dissolve, an event that led to 
elections. They were held in June and gave the Kemalists a slim majority. The new 
chamber began its works on 11 August and Mustafa Kemal was elected president of 
the Assembly. On 23 August 1923 the New Assembly ratified the Treaty of Lausanne 
and, as a result, this event led to the international recognition of the new state. 
(Ahmad, 1993, p. 53) Ratification of this Treaty was the first important political act of 
the newly elected Assembly. (LEWIS, 2001, p. 260) 
 In October 1923, Ismet (Inönü), who was to become soon Prime Minister and 
later succeed Mustafa Kemal as president of the country, had a revolutionary 
proposal: To make Ankara the seat of the government of the new Turkish state. The 
party accepted his proposal and later was voted by the Assembly. This was of course 
a major political defeat for the more conservative ones and a blow to their morale 
since for them Istanbul was the center of the old Sultanate. (Ahmad, 1993, p. 53) The 
fact that Kemal refused to visit Istanbul (he did so later, in 1928) shows the 
bitterness that existed between Kemalists and conservatives. (Ahmad, 1993, p. 54) 
This shift had an important symbolic meaning: The fact that Turkey broke with its 
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past and turns a new page starting anew. (Lewis, 1974, p. 89) In fact, the new state 
that got rid of its past wasn’t based on a dynasty, an empire or on an Islamic faith 
but on the nation, which was based in Ankara, the heart of the Turkish homeland. 
(LEWIS, 2001, p. 261) 
 The next change that Kemal had in mind was the proclamation of the Turkish 
Republic. The abolition of the Sultanate and the continuation of a separate Caliphate 
had created an ambiguity in the headship of the state which, according to Kemal, 
was dangerous. Many people, many of them were being members of the Assembly, 
still considered the Caliph to be the legitimate sovereign and head of the state 
despite the recent changes brought. So, he decided to act. At the beginning of 
October rumors began to circulate that Kemal was planning to proclaim a Republic, 
which resulted in impassioned discussion. At the end of October Kemal came to the 
Chamber and proposed some Constitutional amendments which, according to him, 
would remove the current ambiguities in Turkey’s political system. In the draft 
amendment it was clearly stated that the form of government of Turkey is a republic, 
the President is elected from the Grand National Assembly members and is the head 
of the state. Also, according to the draft, Prime Minister is being appointed by the 
President from the Grand National Assembly members. In addition, all the other 
ministers are chosen by the Prime Minister among the other GNA members. (LEWIS, 
2001, p. 261), (Lewis, 1974, p. 91) 
 After many hours of heated discussions and debate, the resolution was 
carried with 158 among 287 members voting yes. Also, Mustafa Kemal was elected 
the first President of the Republic. He, in turn, appointed Ismet Inonu as his first 
Prime Minister. (LEWIS, 2001, p. 262) 
 Those who voted against the proclamation of the Republic were mostly 
conservative people that felt that it would sever the links of the Turkish people with 
their Islamic and Imperial past as well as the whole Muslim world. They continued to 
view the Caliph and the Caliphate as a counter-force to the President and the new 
Republic. So, these forces of tradition would gather around the Caliph. Mustafa 
Kemal was well aware of this possible development and decided to act by breaking 
that link of the Caliphate with the past and with Islam. He and his supporters knew 
that as long as The Caliphate and the traditional Islamic institutions continued to 
exist the supporters of the old regime would always be able to oppose them and 
undermine their efforts to reform Turkey. (LEWIS, 2001, p. 263), (Ahmad, 1993, p. 
54) 
 On 1 March 1924 Mustafa Kemal, in the Assembly, emphasized three main 
points: The need to safeguard and stabilize the Republic, the creation of a unified 
system of education and the need to “cleanse and elevate the Islamic faith by 
rescuing it from the position of a political instrument, to which it has been for 
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centuries.” The meaning of his third point was explained the following day. So, 
Kemal’s proposals were discussed in the Assembly and they reached a decision 
which was announced on 3 March 1924. They decided the deposition of the Caliph, 
the abolition of the Caliphate and the banishment of all Ottoman house members 
from Turkish territory. The next day the last Caliph, Abulmecid, was exiled. The 
abolition of the Caliphate was Kemal’s first open assault against the Islamic 
Orthodoxy and its supporters. (LEWIS, 2001, p. 264) 
 Initially, Kemalists didn’t want to abolish the Caliphate. Instead, they wished 
to just neutralize Islam politically and accommodate it. But, when they realized that 
conservatives would be a danger to their plans they decided to act and moved on 
with the abolition of Caliphate. (Ahmad, 1993, p. 54) 
 Kemal and his people didn’t stop with the abolition but they also stripped the 
power of ulemas. (They were the authorized defenders of the Islamic faith) Despite 
their authority being greatly reduced since the begging of the Ottoman reforms, they 
retained great power and influence. Actually, they were controlling a large part of 
the educational facilities as well as the code they administered was the dominant 
one regarding family and personal matters. After the disappearance of the Sultanate 
they remained the only ones in Turkey that had the authority to challenge the new 
regime of Mustafa Kemal. The latter didn’t want them hinder his revolutionary work. 
So, he abolished the ancient office of Seyh-ul-Islam and the Ministry of Seriat. Also, 
he closed the religious schools and colleges and he abolished the Seriat courts in 
which judges were taking decisions based on the Holy Law of Islam. The new order 
was confirmed in the new, republican constitution, adopted by the Grand National 
Assembly on 20 April 1924. In the same constitution the legislative authority of the 
Assembly was confirmed. In addition, according to the constitution, judicial function 
would be reserved for independent courts, acting in the name of the nation and not 
religious ones. (LEWIS, 2001, p. 265) 
  According to the new constitution, power is derived by the Big National 
Assembly which expressed the Nation’s will. Decisions would be reached by the 
majority of the Grand National Assembly members. Those who didn’t vote yes had to 
accept the majority’s decision though. In essence, this meant that the result of each 
voting procedure was decisive and couldn’t be changed. In particular, government 
just announced and explained their decisions. Sometimes, if the matter discussed 
wasn’t too sensitive, government changed or amended their decisions but in 
general, government officials did whatever they wished without opposition. 
(ZÜRCHER, 2004, p. 242) The Constitution comprised 105 articles and a unicameral 
parliament with a mixed system, partly presidential and partly parliamentary was 
established. It also enshrined fundamental rights of citizens.  
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 The Constitution’s articles regarding the state and Islam relations didn’t 
remain the same through the years, reflecting the big changes in Islam’s role for the 
Turkish nationalism. Initially, Islam was considered to be the official religion of the 
republic of Turkey and an important part of the Turkish national identity. Despite this 
fact, during the next years, Turkey was subjected to a top-down secularization 
process that changed society completely. The aim of the authorities, mainly Mustafa 
Kemal, was to modernize the country. So, Islam in public affairs was decreasing 
gradually because of these changes and the religion was rejected as a component of 
national identity. This process began before the promulgation of the new 
Constitution on 1924 with the abolishment of the Caliphate and the Ministry of 
Religious affairs. (Saleem, 2017, p. 38)  
 Nevertheless, despite these changes, Islam wasn’t rejected by the 
Constitution. In the Article 2 stated:  
The religion of the Turkish state is Islam. The official language is Turkish. The seat of 
government is Ankara.  
 As Mustafa Kemal himself stated, his goal was to decrease Islam’s role and 
modernize the country, not to ban the practice of the Islamic religion. In addition, 
besides the second article, there were other references to Islam too in the 
Constitution. For instance, in article 26 is stated that the Grand National Assembly 
would execute the Shariah itself and not religious scholars. Also, the oath of the 
Assembly members started with “I swear to God”. Therefore, Islam may be less 
important for the new Turkish Republic but it remains an important part of Turkish 
society and everyday life. (Saleem, 2017, p. 39) 
 On the 8th of February 1925 a Kurdish revolution erupted. Because of this 
sudden crisis, a new law was voted that aimed to stabilize the regime and Turkey in 
general. This law, which is called the Law for the Maintenance of Order, gave the 
government superpowers. In practice, Kemalists were able to do whatever they 
pleased without any opposition. Mustafa Kemal and his people took advantage of 
these increased powers in order to move on with the radical reforms for the country 
that they had in mind. Should this law didn’t give them this authority their work 
would be much harder because opposing political forces and the mass people would 
surely protest to these reforms they had in mind. So, unchallenged and unopposed 
by anyone, Mustafa Kemal, Ismet Inonu and his other supporters, over the next 
years, changed the image of Turkey by introducing many reforms and producing 
legislation that altered the legal face of Turkey. Their goal, as stated earlier, was to 
create a modern and secular country. (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 58, 62) 
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b. Secularization reforms 
  Republican People’s Party, the party that Mustafa Kemal controlled, was the 
dominant one in the Turkish political life. Kemalists were controlling everything in 
the country and had the authority to do whatever they wished. So, they took 
advantage of the increased powers they were given and proceeded reforming the 
country. 
 As stated in previous pages, the first secular reforms were the abolition of 
Sultanate, Ministry of Seriat and Caliphate and the stripping of power of Ulemas and 
Seyh-ul-Islam. In their place, two new institutions were found in 1924, the Diyanet 
işlerı müdürlügü (Presidency of Religious Affairs) and Evkaf ümüm müdürlügü 
(Directorate-General of Pious Foundations ). The head of Presidency of Religious 
Affairs was nominated by the Prime Minister and the duties of this institution were 
the administration of mosques, the appointment and the dismissal of imams and 
other religious staff the supervision of the muftis in general. The Directorate of the 
Pious Foundations was responsible for the administration of the pious foundations 
that had been taken over by the state. Suffice it to say, the formation of new 
religious organizations is now forbidden. These changes are really important because 
they show the aim of Republican People’s Party. They wished to gain control of the 
religion and not just abolish it by making it illegal. That’s why they found two new 
institutions controlled by the state instead of just abolishing the older ones. 
(ZÜRCHER, 2004, p. 254), (LEWIS, 2001, p. 413) 
 Reformers paid special attention to education. Their goal was for an 
education system that would create a modern and secular society as they believed 
that education is the means in order to achieve this goal.  That way, Turkey will 
become a part of the modern, civilized world. In 1924, with the new Law of 
Unification of Instruction, education becomes unified, and is now completely secular. 
This means that that there isn’t a dichotomy between religious and secular 
education. Of course, there aren’t separate institutions for providing secular or 
religious education and the multiplicity of educational authority among Muslims, 
non-Muslims and foreigners is no more. Medrese schools and religious colleges are 
abolished and, according to the new law, are forbidden. In their place, new religious 
schools are found, the Imam Hatips, whose purpose was the training of preachers 
and imams as well as one new Theological Department in Istanbul’s University. Also, 
in 1928, after the second article that claimed that the official state religion is Islam 
was deleted from the Constitutions, classes about Islamic religion were dropped 
from schools. Teaching of the Arabic and Persian language also stops, the aim now is 
to focus on the national language, Turkish. Now, according to the new educational 
policy, all children have to receive secular education. Suffice it to say, education now 
is controlled by the government and religious officials have no influence regarding 
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education. (Lewis, 1974, p. 94), . (ZÜRCHER, 2004, p. 254), (BERKES, 1998, pp. 476-
477), (Akpinar, 2007, p. 161) 
  Because of the secularizing reforms of 1924, Ulemas were stripped of their 
authority and influence. But they weren’t the only ones that could pose a threat to 
Mustafa Kemal’s plans.  These changes didn’t affect the dervishes at all. The latter 
remained part of the people and they had great influence and prestige. So, they had 
the potential to oppose Kemal’s plans, as in the past they were able to penetrate 
into the apparatus of government and instigate religious or social revolt. (LEWIS, 
2001, pp. 406,409) As a result, Kemal was quick to act. During the Independence 
tribunal that took place on 29 June 1925, immediately after the Kurdish revolt, along 
with the passing of death sentence to the leaders of the revolution the judgment 
ordered the closing of the dervish convents in Kurdistan. This was the first blow that 
dervishes suffered from the regime. (LEWIS, 2001, p. 410)Soon, Kemal stripped them 
of their influence. After a series of speeches that took place in the August of 1925, 
during which Kemal criticized the superstitions, beliefs and practices of dervishes, on 
the 1st of September he announced a series of new decrees. By these decrees, which 
were confirmed by laws voted from the Assembly, the dervish brotherhoods are 
dissolved and banned, their assets impounded, their convents and sanctuaries closed 
and their prayer meetings and ceremonies prohibited. Therefore, as Mustafa Kemal 
envisioned, Turkey is now free of feyhs, dervishes, dedes, felebis, habas, emirs, 
fortune-tellers, magicians and witch doctors as well as their services and practices. 
Of course, many disagreed and resisted to these new secularizing measures but 
Mustafa Kemal’s and his Party’s decisions were absolute. In some regions dervishes 
and other religious people tried to mobilize the public against the reforms and the 
regime but they were swiftly punished. (LEWIS, 2001, p. 411) 
 The next step towards secularization and modernization was the ban of 
traditional Islamic and religious clothing. First, Mustafa Kemal, in a series of 
speeches, he attacked these traditional Islamic garments, calling them wasteful, 
uncomfortable, and, above all, barbarous-unworthy of a civilized people. Then, he 
proceeded with the ban. On 2nd of September, with a new decree he banned the fez 
and religious garments and insignia for persons not holding a religious office. 
Instead, civil servants had to start wearing the costume, which is 'common to the 
civilized nations of the world'. These religious clothes can now be worn only inside 
mosques and religious sites. Initially, ordinary citizens were free to dress as they 
wished but on 25th of November a new law obliged everyone to start wearing the 
costume and the hat. Suffice it to say, Kemal’s speeches contributed to the 
disappearance of the veil in big cities. Many people believe that he outlawed it but 
he never did. Religious garments were considered to be an Ottoman symbol and that 
is precisely why Kemal wanted their abolition. In addition, according to the leader of 
the Republican People’s Party, banning of religious garments symbolizes that the 
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secular identity of the state is superior and more important than the religion and 
that state has the monopoly of power. What’s more, abandonment of the fez and 
traditional religious clothing in general meant that distinctions based on social and 
religious criteria no longer exist. Of course, many people were against these 
changes. The strange thing is that many Turks welcomed the abolishment of the 
Caliphate but reacted furiously when their favorite fez was banned. Thousands of 
them got prosecuted and punished, since Kemal’s people, due to the Law for 
preserving order being active, had the authority to do so. (ZÜRCHER, 2004, pp. 
237,254), (LEWIS, 2001, pp. 268,269), (Lewis, 1974, p. 104), (Ahmad, 1993, p. 79) 
 One important step forward for Turkey was the adaptation of the Swiss civil 
code. The final and complete code was voted by the Assembly on the 17th of 
February 1926 and entered into force on 4th of October of the same year. This 
development was really important for Turkey because this is the first time that a 
reformer had dared to produce legislation that challenges and attacks head-on the 
Islamic Holy Law and has to do with matters of religious and family life. Earlier 
reforms, during the Tanzimat period, were about administrative, commercial and 
criminal law. (LEWIS, 2001, p. 272) The changes brought by the new Turkish civil 
code were groundbreaking for such a conservative society. Polygamy and the 
concepts of dignity of women and ancient bars to the freedom were abolished. Also, 
civil marriage and divorce come to their place with the law providing equal rights for 
both man and woman. In addition, the marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-
Muslim man now is legally possible, something that came as a shock to the Turkish 
society. Another shocking reform was the right for all adults to change their religion 
at will. Of course, the voting of this new civil code didn’t transform the country 
immediately. In towns and villages near the main roads and railway lines these new 
laws were enforced. But, in many villages that are more secluded, the old ways 
survived. But the citadel had been breached, the country is under a process of 
reform and the conservative ones were forced into a clandestine resistance. (LEWIS, 
2001, p. 273) 
 Another symbol of the past to be abolished was the old calendar used during 
the Ottoman period. On the 26th of December it was abolished and in its place the 
Gregorian calendar was adopted. At the same time, the twenty-four international 
clock was confirmed as the only legal way of measuring time. (LEWIS, 2001, pp. 270-
271) 
 One of the most important reforms was the adoption of the Latin alphabet. 
Initially, during the Ottoman period, the alphabet used was a mixed one, consisting 
of both Arabic and Persian characters. Since 1923, there have been talks about the 
alphabet change but it was fiercely opposed by religious conservative cycles. But, 
after 1925 and the Law for the maintenance of order, opposition is silenced. So, 
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during the August of 1928 the President announced the replacement of the old 
alphabet with the Latin one. Since the 1st January on the next year it would be used 
obligatory. The reason why Kemal and his followers promoted this change is because 
they wanted to sever ties with the Ottoman past and to approach the civilized west. 
Also, they believed that it would be a very effective way to tackle illiteracy-the 
majority of the population wasn’t able to read or write. (ZÜRCHER, 2004, p. 255), 
(Ahmad, 1993, p. 81) 
 Reforms continue during the following years. In 1928 western numbers are 
adopted as well as the western weight and measures system in 1931. Also, in 1928, 
the second article from the Constitution that stated that the official religion is Islam 
was removed. In 1934, with a new law every citizen was obliged to use a surname, 
exactly like is done in western countries. Mustafa Kemal adopted the surname 
Ataturk, which means in Turkish the father of the Turks. Only he and his siblings are 
allowed to use this surname. Also, women gain the right to vote and get elected. In 
1935 for the first time women are elected as Grand National Assembly members. 
They also are able now to work and follow a career like men do. Professions like 
drivers, pilots, singers and beauty queens are now open, at least in theory, for 
women in Turkey. In addition, after 1934 the titles pasha, effendi, bey and hanim, 
which were used before are being replaced by Bay and Bayan. (In Turkish: sir and 
madam respectively) After 1935 the official off-day is Sunday, like most of the 
western countries. All of these changes have a strong symbolic meaning. Reformers 
aimed to make Turkey appear to be a European country, something that will make 
communication and having relations with the west easier (ZÜRCHER, 2004, p. 254), 
(LEWIS, 2001, pp. 288-289), (Lewis, 1974, pp. 121,124) 
 In sum, Mustafa Kemal’s revolutionary reforms changed Turkey completely. 
By making use of the absolute powers that were given to him with the Law of 
Maintenance and order he made good use of this authority to make his vision that 
he had in mind for Turkey a reality. So, in a pretty short period of time, around ten 
years, he changed almost everything in the country, including the importance and 
role of religion for the country, everyday people’s customs and way of life and even 
the alphabet of the Turkish language itself. But the big question is: Why did he do it? 
What about his goal and how about his way of thinking that led him to this kind of 
reforms and changes?  
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c.Kemal Ataturk’s goal and vision for Turkey 
  The new state that emerged in 1923, the Republic of Turkey, was 
impoverished, numerically decimated and its population was ethnically mixed, with 
90% of it being Muslim. As stated earlier, Kemal Ataturk wanted to reform the 
country and change it completely. According to him, in order for the country to be 
saved two things had to be done. First, this mass of people had to feel that they 
belonged to the same nation. Second, he wanted to make the society modern and 
civilized. (ZÜRCHER, 2010 , p. 136) After his Party changed its name (now its name is 
Republican People’s Party) and its manifesto was published Kemal’s goal was made 
clear.  It was made clear that the party he found was a pro-European party with 
secular and nationalistic identity. (ZÜRCHER, 2004, p. 232) In other words, he wanted 
Turkey to become a modern, secular country and his ideal model was western 
European states. Kemal Ataturk completely agreed with Abdullah Cevdet, a well-
known Ottoman intellectual, when the latter argued that 'Civilization means 
European civilization'. While speaking to the Assembly in 1924, after the laws against 
the theocracy passed from the Grand National Assembly, he argued that Turkey has 
at least overcome the obstacles that for centuries kept it from joining the other 
developed and cultured countries and now the path for progress is open. (LEWIS, 
2001, p. 267) For Ataturk, uncivilized people, in essence countries that don’t accept 
western European values are doomed to remain under the feet of the civilized world 
since they are inferior.  Therefore, Turkey must reform itself, adopt these values and 
join the club of the superior, civilized countries in order to survive. (LEWIS, 2001, p. 
268) 
 Kemal Ataturk had exactly this line of thinking when he decided to abolish 
the fez and the rest of the traditional Islamic garments. For him, they were an 
emblem of fanaticism and ignorance and symbolized the halt to progress that Turkey 
was experiencing. Of course, he also argued that the hat and the costume were used 
by the civilized world. So, according to his way of thinking, they had to start wearing 
the latter in order to start behaving like modern citizens from the western states. It 
could be said that this was the central pillar of the revolution.(LEWIS, 2001, p. 268) 
 As stated in the previous chapter, Ataturk took measures against ulemas and 
dervishes, the religious cycles. For him, ulemas and dervishes were responsible for 
superstitions dwelling in people’s minds. Examples of these superstitions are seeking 
the help of the dead and the practice of fortune telling. For Mustafa Kemal, it was a 
disgrace for today’s civilized world, where science, knowledge and civilization 
thrives, to have customs like these. (LEWIS, 2001, pp. 410-411) 
 In sum, Ataturk’s vision for the new Turkey wasn’t an Islamic state. For him 
and his comrades such a state would maintain the status quo and perpetuate the 
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backwardness of Turkey. That’s why they wanted to transform Turkey, to make it a 
secular, modern state, similar to the western, civilized European countries. Of 
course, he believed in the greatness of the Turkish civilization. But, according to him, 
because of the influence of Arab religion’s influence, which was dominant for many 
centuries, Turks weren’t able to reach greatness and their true potential. 
Nevertheless, he didn’t want to ban Islam. His goal was to sever Islam’s influence by 
severing Islam and state. That way, according to his vision, Turkey could be able to 
reach the level of western civilization countries.  (Ahmad, 1993, p. 53), (Lewis, 1974, 
p. 92) 
 At the same time that the country was being transformed, Republican 
People’s party began to produce a new ideology which was called Kemalism or 
Ataturkism.  
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d.Kemalist Ideology and its basic characteristics 
 The new ideology aimed to inspire the state in order to progress rapidly as 
well as to win the allegiance of the people. In essence, the goal was to replace Islam 
and Ottomanism with nationalism. That way, the ties with the past would be 
destroyed. (Ahmad, 1993, p. 61) This ideology got formed during the 1930s. In 
particular, it became wıdely known when Kemal Ataturk published his famous 
manifesto which was accepted and adopted by Republican People’s Party and later, 
in 1937, became a part of the Turkish constitution. It isn’t a cohesive ideology, it 
consists of six different ideas that aren’t clearly defined and explained. The ideas 
that form this ideology are republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism 
and revolutionary thinking. Secularism and nationalism were among the most 
important characteristics for the new Turkey that emerged after the regime of Kemal 
Ataturk begun. Kemalism is being taught at schools and is being advocated and 
defended by both the army and the media. At the center of it lies Kemal Ataturk who 
is being preached as a God and is considered to be the teacher, mentor and father of 
the Turkish nation. (ZÜRCHER, 2004, pp. 247-248), (LEWIS, 2001, p. 286) 
 Republicanism means that the government’s power and authority derives 
from the people. The basis of the government is democracy. Voters authorize a party 
to form a government through the election process. Of course, when Republicanism 
came to be Turkey wasn’t a Parliamentary democracy with multi-party elections, 
freedom of speech and expression, freedom of Press, religious freedom and rule of 
law. Kemal Ataturk just started the process of transformation of the old Ottoman 
Empire into a modern, liberal western society. In the beginning of the Turkish 
Republic, Kemalist regime wasn’t a pluralistic one and opposing voices were 
suppressed. During that time, Republicanism for Turkey meant that the country 
rejected the old, approved by God ruler, Sultan, and its replacement by a new, 
secular one. Turkey in theory is a republic since 1923, when the Grand National 
Assembly decided, after Mustafa Kemal’s suggestion, the proclamation of the 
Turkish Republic.(Evaggelia, 2015, p. 31), (Antonios, 2016, pp. 27-28) Republicanism 
was generally accepted by everyone with the exception of those who still yearned 
for the restoration of the Ottoman dynasty. These people were a small minority 
without any political influence. (Ahmad, 1993, p. 63) 
 Statism accepts that state is the dominant one regarding economic activity. It 
is actually a mix of free economy with the governmental control of big enterprises 
and the control of the total economy for the whole country’s well-being. The idea of 
statism means that the state participates in the economic activity in sectors that the 
private sector is unwilling or is incompetent to do so or simply when government 
officials think that it is the best for the national interest. (Evaggelia, 2015, p. 33), 
(ZÜRCHER, 2004, p. 247) Kemalism accepts government intervention in the economy 
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but it should not be compared with socialism because the former accepts and 
welcomes private and individual initiative. In addition, politicians in Turkey had no 
intention to establish state monopolies or collectivizing the economy. Some 
examples of economic activity that the state participated were public banks, 
factories that produced matches, alcohol, sugar, tobacco and explosives. (Antonios, 
2016, p. 31), (LEWIS, 2001, p. 286) Statism was a controversial idea and many were 
confused when it came into effect because neither the party nor the government 
clearly defined the limits of state intervention into the economy. Of course, private 
sector actors who had connections inside the Republican People’s Party were really 
satisfied. (Ahmad, 1993, p. 63) 
 Revolutionism was one of the most important principles of Kemalism. Turkey 
has to be reformed and to replace old and obsolete institutions with new and 
modern ones. Of course, Turkey needs to adapt to the standards set by the western 
civilization. As a result, citizens’ lives will be improved and the society as a whole will 
progress and develop. As analyzed earlier, Kemal Ataturk reformed the country and 
changed almost every aspect of the new state that emerged after the dissolution of 
the Sultanate extremely fast. (Evaggelia, 2015, p. 35) 
 Populism assures that people is the dominant one in the democratic political 
scene through the rule of law. Elected officials and local government are a sign of 
populism and through them Turkish citizens participate to the administration of the 
country. This reform aims to protect the people. Kemalism rejects social and any 
kind of class cleavage and doesn’t accept the superiority of any social class. In other 
words, every citizen is equal before the law. Populism just states that the important 
value is the Turkish citizenship and nationality and wants every citizen to feel proud 
and happy because of it. Of course, this will have a very positive development 
because these citizens will have an increased morale and, as a result, will work 
harder and the national camaraderie and unity will be achieved. (Evaggelia, 2015, p. 
33) Populism was suitable for the new ruling class, it legitimized their power since 
they are the trustees of the people that act in favor of their interests, and rejected 
the concept of class conflict. (Ahmad, 1993, p. 63) 
 Nationalism means that the country is independent, powerful and free from 
the influence of other states. Nationalism defines Turks as those who share the same 
language, culture and territory and who protect and promote the moral, spiritual, 
cultural and humanitarian values of the Turkish nation. The latter is all the people 
that live inside the borders of the Turkish Republic, they wish the well-being of their 
country and they know to handle their duties towards the democratic, secular state 
for everyone’s well-being. Actually, what Kemal Ataturk tried to do was to create a 
new collective identity for all the people that lived inside the territory of Turkey. For 
this purpose, his reforms aimed to modernize the state and to break the link with 
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the Ottoman past by erasing all the characteristics of the Ottoman Empire. For 
instance, history was written again, the focus for the newer historians is the Turks’ 
pre-Islam history. Researchers wanted to write a history of the Turkish nation that is 
free of Islamic influence. In addition, for the same reason the language was 
reformed, because Kemalists wanted to cleanse it from Persian and Arabic 
influences.  (Evaggelia, 2015, p. 32), (Antonios, 2016, pp. 28-29) 
 Secularism was the most important idea of Kemalism along with nationalism. 
In a secular state religion and the state are separate and the former doesn’t control 
the latter and has any influence over it. The Turkish version of secularism is the same 
as the French laicism, according to which religion and the state are separate and the 
latter controls the religion by state institutions. (The instrument for keeping Islam in 
check that was found by Kemalists is the Diyanet or Directorate of Religious Affairs) 
Every law that gets voted has to be of secular nature and policy makers need to take 
into account that Turkey is a secular country. In addition, Islamic officials have no 
power or authority and citizens are free to practice any religion they want without 
any control or restriction from the state. Any religious institutions will be controlled 
by the state. Of course, all religions are allowed and all believers are free to 
communicate the teachings of their religion freely without any form of harassment. 
In addition, Kemalists believe that the search for the truth of God pleases him but 
the obligatory focus on one specific religion does not. So, secularism doesn’t reject 
religion but it argues that it must not be mixed with science and politics. Faith and 
religious practice is everyone’s right but its place is inside the house or the religious 
site and not inside the school.  
 Kemal Ataturk himself wasn’t against the Islamic religion. The exact opposite, 
he believed that it is necessary for the public life but he didn’t want law and order to 
be affected or replaced by it. (Evaggelia, 2015, p. 34), (ZÜRCHER, 2004, p. 247), 
(Antonios, 2016, p. 29), (BERKES, 1998, p. 279), (Larrabee, 2008, p. 11)The basis of 
the religious policy of Kemal’s party wasn’t irreligion. Kemal Ataturk didn’t want to 
ban religion, just to end the power of religion, to limit it to matters of belief and 
worship and control it. Actually, laicism, as understood by Kemal Ataturk and his own 
men, means that the state has the upper hand regarding the relations between the 
state and religion, controls religious institutions but also has the authority to 
regulate the lived Islamic tradition and expression of popular religiosity .In other 
words, Ataturk wanted to separate religion and politics and break the former’s 
control over people’s minds. (LEWIS, 2001, p. 412), (Saleem, 2017, p. 43) 
 Secularism was accepted by the majority of the population. Religion was 
made a matter of individual conscience and was freed by those who used it as a tool 
for their personal aspirations. (Ahmad, 1993, p. 63) However, the reforms were 
accepted mainly by those who lived in the western part of Turkey and in the big 
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cities. The east resisted secularization and Turkification. Despite the secularization 
reforms, in rural areas religious conservatism and feudal structures continued to 
govern rural life.  The old Institutions, schools and religious structures were 
destroyed but the old practices weren’t abandoned: The characteristics of the pre-
Republican Ottoman society simply had gone underground.  (Öktem, 2011, pp. 29, 
38) 
 During the 1930s, there was a strong pressure for secularization. The fact 
that no more mosques were built in the new capital and the transformation of the 
great basilica of Santa Sophia into a museum (during the Ottoman period it 
functioned as a mosque) are some striking examples of this trend. (LEWIS, 2001, p. 
416) 
 Undoubtedly, the regime did lots of reforms in the country and contributed 
to its progress. But, despite Kemal Ataturk and his supporters talking about 
democracy, it was an authoritarian regime that had the monopoly of power and 
there was a focus on nationalism, national homogeneity and camaraderie that 
imposed from above the changes and reforms to the population. This secularization 
has been heavily criticized because it has been hostile to the religion, preventing 
Turkey from becoming a country with a true, consolidated democracy. (ZÜRCHER, 
2004, p. 252),  
 Summing up, Turkey had undergone immense changes in just a few years 
after Kemal Ataturk came to power. Kemalism, or the ideology of Kemal Ataturk and 
his supporters, in essence aimed to create a secular country where the focus would 
be Turkish nationalism.  Despite the reforms there is evidence that secularization of 
the country wasn’t as complete as its admirers thought. Religion continued to be 
popular in the peoples’ eyes despite reformers’ efforts, especially in small towns and 
villages that were far away from big cities. So, it could be said that at the same time 
two cultures existed in Turkey: The secular, westernized culture that have ties with 
the bureaucracy and the indigenous culture of the mass of people who continue to 
believe in Islamic religion. After the Second World War, when opposition was at last 
permitted and multi-party elections became a reality, there are attempts to 
challenge the dominant Kemalist bureaucracy. So, an Islamic reassertion begins, 
political forces rise in the following years that try to exploit this alienation that those 
traditional believers felt and gain their support. So, an Islamic reassertion begins 
which lasts for several decades and continues even today in Turkey.(LEWIS, 2001, pp. 
416, 424), (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 63,92) 
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3. Rise of Political Islam in modern Turkey 
a. Prior to the appearance of political Islam 
 After the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1938, his right- hand man, Ismet 
Inonu, became the next president of the country and continued the secularization 
policy that his predecessor initiated.  During Inonu’s Presidency the Constitution was 
amended, Arabic and Persian words were deleted from the original 1924 
Constitution and were replaced by Turkish ones. Also, words that showed an Islamic 
influence too were discarded from the Constitution. Thus, Islam’s banishment from 
Turkish state nationalism was almost complete. 
  The monopoly of political authority from Republican People’s Party came to 
an end in the late 1940s when multi-Party elections were held for the first time, 
which meant the end of the single-party rule. This fact had an unexpected 
consequence. People who lived in the periphery, in rural areas and not in big cities, 
continued to keep in touch with Islam which still had huge effect in their lives 
because of the limited effect of the secularist reforms in their hometowns. In cities 
though, Islam was banished from the public sphere, it was supervised and 
suppressed by the state and its institutions. Ataturk’s secularization reforms were 
mostly accepted by the Turkish elite, and the people who were not a part of the 
elite, who were living in the periphery, were feeling alienated inside their own 
country. As a result, politicians had to start taking into account their opinions too 
since now more opposing parties exist that have to compete for a seat in 
government and these people are the majority of the population. In other words, 
their support means their votes will be given to the party that fights for their rights. 
So, Islam now stops being secluded from Turkish political life and becomes instead a 
permanent part of it. Even members of the dominant Republican People’s Party 
started criticizing secularist policies, out of fear of losing their seats in the 
government. Thus, Kemal’s former party decided to be more tolerant towards 
religion. Despite winning the 1946 elections they quickly realized that they had to 
change their stance towards Islam and the population that continued to view it as 
something really important for their identity. It could be said that this development 
was an important breaking point for the rise of political Islam.  (Saleem, 2017, pp. 
40-41), (Evaggelia, 2015, p. 40), (Antonios, 2016, p. 40) 
 Hence, CHP (Republican People’ party) made some changes that relaxed the 
restrictions imposed on religion before the next elections of 1950. Some of them 
were the relaxation of restrictions on religion education in schools, provision of 
foreign exchange for pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, the opening of tombs that belong to 
some Muslim saints, the initiation of new educational courses for prayer leaders, the 
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establishment of a faculty of Theology at the University of Ankara and the expansion 
of Diyanet. However, there didn’t change any part of the constitution, the secularist 
nature of the state was left intact. (Saleem, 2017, p. 39) 
 Despite these reforms, CHP lost the elections in 1950 and the Democratic 
Party (DP), which had Menderes as the one in charge, won by receiving 415 out of 
485 Grand National Assembly seats. Democratic Party appealed to parts of the 
society that felt alienated and repressed from the westernizing and secularist 
policies and promised to terminate some of the really strict secular policies that the 
Kemalist regime initiated.  The various religious groups were pleased with this 
development; they argued that this was a deliverance from the ‘Godless People’s 
Party’. Actually, DP wasn’t an Islamic Party but one committed to secularism but at a 
less aggressive way. Menderes didn’t attempt to reverse Ataturk’s most important 
secularization reforms, such as adopting the Swiss civil code or amending the 
Constitution to reject secularism. What Menderes and his Party did was to make 
Islam legal again and made it possible for Islamic political actors to participate in the 
Turkish political scene. Democratic party lifted many of the restrictions on religious 
actions with acts such as permitting prayer calling in Arabic,  allowing religious 
programming on radio run by the state, making religious education compulsory in 
elementary schools (it wasn’t compulsory, parents were able to opt out), setting up 
schools for prayer leaders and increasing the funding of the Diyanet. Also, Menderes 
gave leeway to banned religious groups that supported him and contributed to his 
electoral success.  
 Regarding Islam, the biggest change was reverting to the pre-1945 version of 
the 1924 Constitution. In 1952, the Turkified version of the Constitution, which 
didn’t have any Persian or Arabic words, was replaced by its previous version that 
had Arabic and Persian words. But one of the most important principles of the 
Republic, which is secularism, was still a part of the Constitution. Regarding this 
matter, Menderes didn’t deviate from Kemal Ataturk’s vision. 
 Menderes government also focused on human rights and liberties, to the 
tackling of bureaucracy, economic freedom, agricultural reform and economic 
growth. New liberal policies freed the economy from state intervention. These 
almost revolutionary policies were perceived to be dangerous, heretic and not loyal 
to the ideology of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Also, the economy was in a really bad 
condition, government was really corrupt and failed to almost every aspect and that 
led to the coup organized by military officers that took place on the May of 1960 
which resulted to its downfall. (Evaggelia, 2015, pp. 40-41), (Saleem, 2017, p. 39) 
Military takeover was viewed by the majority of the population as a positive and 
necessary development because that way the perversion of the democracy by 
Menderes and his government would be avoided. Military officers took over and 
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they remained in power until the October of 1961 (they had promised that they 
would return power to the people when their role had been finished). Prime 
Minister Adnan Menteres, Foreign Minister Zorlu and Finance Minister Polatkan 
were executed. In addition, Islamic brotherhood members as well as parliamentary 
members of the Democratic Party were hunted down and put to jail. Their crime was 
that they were responsible for the backwardness of the country because of their 
leniency towards religion.  (Moudouros, 2011, p. 91), (Knudsen, 2005, p. 7) 
 Despite the short period of time the officers remained in power, they 
managed to leave important footprints on Turkey’s political structure. After the coup 
and during the short regime of the military junta a new Constitution was produced. 
New Institutions were created which changed the political field in the country. The 
Grand National Assembly remains but a senate has been created as well as the 
National Security Council. Junta provided that some of its members become 
permanent members of the Senate. But, Grand National Assembly is the Institution 
which allows the armed officers to directly interfere in politics if the situation is 
‘grave and the security of the state is in danger’. Thus, now the interference of the 
army in politics in Turkey is now institutionally acceptable. Actually, a double-headed 
political system was created, ministers coexisted with military officers within the 
National Security Council on the executive level and the civilian justice system 
coexisted with the military system of justice. (Knudsen, 2005, pp. 7-8) 
 The Constitution had 157 articles. Now the parliamentary system is 
bicameral, it consists of the National Assembly and the newly created Senate. The 
independence of the judiciary was also ensured. Also, it focused on human rights; an 
expanded list of fundamental rights was included in the Constitution. It also 
expanded the right of religious freedom. Now not only can everyone practice the 
religion he/she wishes, as in the 1924 Constitution, but a person couldn’t be 
compelled to worship a particular religion or to participate in a religious ceremony. 
(Saleem, 2017, p. 42) 
 The 1961 Constitution was the most democratic and liberal in the history of 
the Turkish Republic, aimed to tackle authoritarianism and allowed ideological 
pluralism. It encouraged all the progressive forces to take action for a fair society. As 
a result, during the 1960s and 1970s there has been a major increase of independent 
organizations, including religious ones. Army officers believed that this pluralism 
would prevent the rise of authoritarian governments. Nevertheless, despite the 
Constitution forbidding the politicization of Islam (because they were afraid that it 
will lead to the undermining of the state’s secular nature), this ideological pluralism 
led to the rise of political Islam and the appearance of political parties that have 
religion in their official agendas and programs.  The person whose actions 
contributed to the rise of political Islam was Necmettin Erbakan. Also, he was the 
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first person to find an Islamic political party. (Saleem, 2017, p. 42), (Evaggelia, 2015, 
p. 42), (Antonios, 2016, pp. 42-44) 
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b. The rise of Political Islam. Necmettin Erbakan 
 Organized Political Islam appeared in the last years of 1960s but the ground 
was fertile for its appearance much earlier. During the industrialization of Turkey 
those who had small industries and firms couldn’t compete with the big and rich that 
had connections with the Kemalist elite. As a result, these people, that weren’t living 
in the bigger cities but on the periphery and countryside, objected since they were 
second rate citizens and they were isolated from the economy. They needed a 
political force to support them and fight for their rights and interests. This force took 
the form of Political Islam. Thus, Political Islam and its rivalry with the Kemalists 
wasn’t just a rivalry between secular and Islam cycles but between business elites 
who lived in the big cities and those who had small firms and were living in the 
countryside and were secluded from the society and the economy.  (Moudouros, 
2011, pp. 106-108) 
 Political Islam represented 3 big classes. Businessmen who lived in the 
periphery and were merchants or craftsmen, poor classes that lived inside big cities 
but were pious believers of Islam and freelancers that lived in the countryside, had 
Islamic background and received secular education. All of them supported Political 
Islam and the political parties that spawned from it. They did so because they 
believed that this way they would stop being isolated from the economy and they 
would be able to earn. In essence, it was a mix of religious and conservative cycles.  
 As argued earlier, Necmettin Erbakan was the person whose appearance in 
the Turkish political life is tied with the rise of Political Islam.  First of all, Erbakan 
found an Islamic organization in 1969 called Milli görüş (National View) which was 
the main representative of Political Islam and its supporters. Its main ideology is a 
mix of Islamism, national independence, Ottomanism and modernist growth.  They 
also had anti-western, anti-Christian and anti-semetic rhetoric. The goal of this 
organization was to promote Islam and its values and it was the base for all the 
Parties of Political Islam that appeared the following years.  Slowly but steadily these 
people started to become more active and mobilize by finding associations as well as 
various Islamic organizations in many areas of the country. These associations and 
their connections supported Political Islam and helped it spread. For instance, they 
helped Erbakan to start his political career and become a member of the parliament. 
Thus, the founder of Milli görüş movement became an independent parliamentary 
member in 1969 which strengthened the position of Political Islam, since now its 
supporters’ views can now be heard. One year later, in 1970, Necmettin Erbakan 
found the first Islamic Party, the National Order Party. Its leaders came from the 
National View movement that was found about one year ago. This party had its 
electoral base ready before its appearance because of the mobilization of Islamic 
actors who had already started. Almost all the members of the future Islamic parties 
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in Turkey were former members of Milli görüş.  (Moudouros, 2011, pp. 109-112), 
(Incel, 2017, pp. 88-89) 
 National Order Party proposed a new social and economic organization of 
Turkey based on Islamic values which, according to the Party’s officials, were also 
Turkish national ones. In other words, for them Islam is one integral part of Turkish 
identity and they wanted the religion to become the main factor of the society and 
political activity. They believed that Kemal Ataturk’s effort to transform the 
Ottoman-Islamic state with a western and secular one was a historical mistake and, 
according to them, that was the source of all the hardships that Turkey was currently 
facing such as economic underdevelopment. Thus, the ideal solution for the state to 
survive was the return of traditional values and institutions and the creation of a 
new Islamic order that would stop the process of westernization. Of course, from 
now on those who become state officials had to accept these ideas and values. 
Despite talking about Islamic values, party officials didn’t reject science and 
technology. Erbakan in particular believed that the country could develop and 
progress by using the power that comes from its history and culture and he was 
referring to the glorious Ottoman past all the time. Of course, western countries had 
inferior civilization and are immoral because they don’t know the truth that only the 
Islamic religion teaches. For them Turkey is morally superior and belongs to the 
Islamic world and not to the Western one. Erbakan also supported a coalition of 
Islamic countries.(Evaggelia, 2015, pp. 42-43), (Antonios, 2016, p. 47), (Moudouros, 
2011, pp. 116-119) 
 Erbakan and the members of his Party wanted for everyone freedom of 
thought, expression and conscience and they didn’t want anyone to feel repressed. 
They didn’t reject democracy and freedom. They accepted these values but they 
stated that they aren’t western (as argued earlier, they considered the western 
civilization to be an inferior one) but Islamic. For them, a secular state is the state 
where all these freedoms exist and apply for every citizen without any distinction. 
Unfortunately, according to them, these freedoms don’t exist in Turkey, pious ones 
are being repressed and disbelievers repress those who remain loyal to Islam. In 
order for this situation to change, those who are being isolated must fight for their 
rights. Only then will the regime become truly democratic. (Antonios, 2016, pp. 47-
48), (Moudouros, 2011, p. 117) 
 National Order Party did have something common with the Kemalist ideology 
though: It accepted state intervention in the economy. In its program was clearly 
stated that it supported an Islamic intervention to the capitalist development that 
would be administered by the Political Islam.  They weren’t against capitalism, they 
also wanted the periphery to develop and that’s why there were plans about 
investments being made there. (Moudouros, 2011, pp. 113-114) 
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 The Party was deemed illegal on May 20, 1971 by the Constitutional Court 
after pressure from military officers because it violated the principles of laicism laid 
down in the Constitution (Articles 2, 19, 57) and in the Law of Political Parties. But 
they weren’t able to stop Political Islam. One year later, on the October of 1972, a 
new Islamic Political Party was found. Its name was Religious Salvation Party and its 
leader at first was Suleiman Arif Emre.  After the 1973 elections, when the Party 
received the 11.8% of total votes and 48 seats in the Parliament, Erbakan again 
became the leader of the Party after Suleiman Emre quit. These election results were 
really important for Political Islam. Despite it didn’t receive enough votes in order to 
form a self-sufficient government, it was the first time that a party of such nature 
received a high percentage of votes, allowing it to have an important role in the 
formation of future coalition governments. (Moudouros, 2011, pp. 115,117), (Narli, 
1999, p. 39) 
 Because Erbakan’s Party received a pretty good percentage of votes in the 
1973 elections it formed a coalition government with the secularist People’s 
Republican Party, with Bulent Ecevit being the Prime Minister and Erbakan the vice 
Prime Minister. Also, he was the vice-President in the Nationalist Front government 
of Suleiman Demirel (1975-1977), that was formed with the participation of the 
latter’s Justice Party and Alpaslan Turke’s Nationalist Movement Party. In addition, 
Erbakan was vice-President in the second Nationalist Front government (1977-1978) 
and he supported the government that was formed by Suleiman Demirel which was 
later overturned by the military officers in the coup that took place in 1980. 
(Evaggelia, 2015, p. 44) So, during the 1970s decade Political Islam is being 
established as an important political force and many of its members capture 
important seats to every level of public administration and bureaucracy. Moreover, 
it managed to pass a bill that made theological high schools (named Imam-hatip) 
equal to secondary schools and allowed these school’s often pro-Islam students to 
attend universities. So, in the 1980s and 1990s many Political Islam supporters who 
received Islamic education have gone on to political power, one of them being the 
current President of Turkey, Reccep Tayip Erdogan, and have formed a powerful 
pressure group. As a result, Islamist cycles have increased authority and 
businessmen that are its members now have connections with the state and can 
increase their wealth. In a way, Political Islam both becomes a part of the secular 
state and is opposed to it. (Moudouros, 2011, p. 121), (Narli, 1999, p. 39) 
 In the late 1970s Turkey faced dire economic and political problems and the 
successive governments failed to solve them. In addition, the society was harshly 
polarized and antagonism between radical left and radical right escalated into 
violent clashes bordering on civil war. The army, led by Kenan Evren, intervened and 
seized power after a bloodless coup that took place on 12 September 1980. They 
immediately declared Martial Law and the parliament, the Senate, municipal 
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assemblies and mayoralties were dissolved. Then Kenan Evren became President of 
the Republic. The leading parties of the time were banned from political activity as 
well as some of their ex officials like Ecevit and Demirel, their property was seized by 
the state and the political system was restructured with a new Constitution that was 
drafted by the military. For more than three years Turkey was ruled by a five- man 
junta with Kenan Evren as the leader and had supreme executive power. The military 
regime’s goal was, in short term, to stop political violence and in long term to 
prevent violent confrontations from happening again and to achieve stability and 
social peace. They were able to carry out their first goal but at a major cost: Curfews 
were imposed, most public activities were forbidden, a wide range of magazines, 
books, newspapers and movies were banned, many professional associations and 
trade unions were suspended, 650.000 people were detained and around 14.000 
Turks were stripped of their citizenship. In addition, there have been many reports of 
brutal interrogations, 18 leftists and 8 rights were executed and 171 prisoners have 
died as the result of torture. Regarding their second and most important goal, in 
order to succeed they made major changes to the Turkish state and the political 
arena.  (Narli, 1999, p. 39), (Antonios, 2016, p. 51), (Jenkins, 2008., p. 141) 
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c. Political Islam after the 1980 coup 
 After the 1980 coup military officers seized power and made major changes 
to Turkey’s political system. Their goal was to prevent events like the violent clashes 
that took place in the last years of 1970s from happening again. In other words, they 
wanted to prevent communism and left ideologies from rising again. In addition, 
they also wanted to stop Kurdish nationalism because they believed that it could 
pose real danger for the country. Thus, the army tried to reinforce Islam as an 
alternative counterbalance to communism. This way, radical movements will stop 
being attractive. So, they tried to alter the Turkey’s ideological platform. Their aim 
was to create a new form of Turk-Islamic civilization in which the society would be 
reunited again and left ideologies, which were considered dangerous and polarizing 
for the society, would be left out. In addition, they wanted to stop and control the 
Islamic influence that came from Iran, Pakistan ant the Arab world in general. As a 
result, this situation, according to Kenan Evren, will result in a united, powerful and 
stable political and social situation.  Islam now has an important role for the Military 
regime. (Saleem, 2017, p. 45) 
 Thus, the new dogma for Turkey is Turk-Islamic composition. Kenan Evren 
tried to combine Islam with Turkish nationalism. Islamic and national symbols are 
being combined: Family, mosques and military camps are its basic ingredients. The 
military regime adopted Islamic religion and tried to appeal both to the believers 
that accepted secularism and the pious ones that rejected it in order to control the 
social and economic activity of both of them. Islam was used as a tool in order to 
achieve social peace but this Islamization of the society had to be centrally planned 
and controlled.  In the Turkish state the religion and nationalism were combined and 
a conservative environment was created. Of course, this new ideological 
composition changed some of the reforms that Kemal Ataturk brought. But, it was a 
necessary measure in order for Turkey to overcome the polarization and to achieve 
social peace. Kenan Evren himself admitted that he was forced to use religion as a 
tool to persuade the people and to stop polarization. . (Evaggelia, 2015, pp. 55-56), 
(Antonios, 2016, p. 52), (Moudouros, 2011, pp. 126-127) 
 Clearly the army’s views about Islam and its actors have changed. Previously, 
military officers, because they were loyal to Kemal Ataturk and his reforms, wanted 
to defend secularism and to reduce Islam’s influence. They even organized a coup in 
1961 because the government strayed from Ataturk’s legacy, endangering 
secularism. But after the 1980, military officers changed their attitude towards Islam 
and started using it as an instrument. (Saleem, 2017, p. 45) 
 On 1982 a referendum took place in which people voted to accept the new 
Constitution. It had 177 articles and established a unicameral Parliament and a 
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parliamentary system of government. It is considered to be the most authoritarian 
Constitution of Turkish Constitutions. While generally Constitutions aim to limit the 
state’s power and protect the people from it, this one does the exactly opposite: It 
protects the state from people’s actions and doesn’t focus on citizens’ fundamental 
rights.  (Saleem, 2017, p. 45) 
 In this Constitution started a practice that continues even today, the 
promotion of Ataturk as an image in order to protect secularism. Mustafa Kemal is 
praised so much and so fiercely that it seems like the Constitution aimed to create a 
cult that worship him. This was one of its most distinguishing features. Of course, 
this promotion of Ataturk’s image and personality weren’t limited to the 
Constitution. During the decades of 1980 and 1990 his face was increasingly 
depicted on badges, posters, stickers and elsewhere. Suffice it to say, this practice 
was encouraged by the state. Arguing that an “Ataturk mania” started in the country 
isn’t an exaggeration. In addition, for the first time, principle of secularism is 
included in the President’s oath as well as in the oaths of the Grand National 
Assembly members. Another really important change is the role of the Diyanet: Its 
significance increased by making national solidarity and integrity one of its duties: 
The Directorate of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall 
exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of 
secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national 
solidarity and integrity. (Article 136)(Saleem, 2017, p. 46) 
 But, despite their struggle to protect secularism, Islam gained ground in the 
1982 Constitution. Under the army’s guidance, for the first time in the history of the 
Turkish Republic religious education now becomes compulsory to every school for 
primary and secondary education. Classes for the teaching of Quran were created 
and the schools now also focus on religious and moral education with the state’s 
approval. Also, now it is taught that there are similarities between the Turkish 
civilization before and after the appearance of Islam and that there are strong 
connections between Turkish nation and Islam. It could be said that Islam was used 
in order to reinforce Turkish nationalism. Nevertheless, these changes gave to 
Islamists the opportunity to reinforce their position. (Evaggelia, 2015, pp. 55-56), 
(Antonios, 2016, p. 52), (Moudouros, 2011, pp. 126-127) 
 As stated earlier, there have been major changes in the educational system, 
now those who graduated from religious schools can gain access to offices and 
important positions of the state despite its secular nature. It is also allowed to find 
private religious schools. There also has been a major increase in the number of 
these schools and now their graduates are able to gain access to Universities and 
study fields like Law and Public Administration. Many of them were able to start 
working as public servants. In other words, Islamic brotherhood members started 
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gaining access to the mechanism of the state during Ozal’s years. (Moudouros, 2011, 
p. 130) In general, religion’s public role and influence dramatically increased during 
the 1980s. Later, all governments continued these policies. These policies resulted in 
Islamic intellectuals starting to appear and many Islamic brotherhoods and 
associations attract many supporters and start influencing public life (for instance 
Fettulah Gulen’s Hizmet). Political Islam supporters also support and help each 
other: For instance when choosing business partners, they prefer those who belong 
to Political Islam. As a result, slowly but steadily its members gain power and 
connections. (Moudouros, 2011, pp. 156, 159, 161) 
 After this event, in 1983, military officers abandoned political power and 
after general elections the new party that won and formed a government was Turgut 
Ozal’s Party of Mother Country. He continued military regime policies: This party 
combined neo-liberal policies and the new context for Turkey that Kenan Evren 
created that mixed Turkish nationality, secularism and Islamism. It was the dominant 
party in the 1980s. Its main characteristics were religious and nationalistic 
conservatism and economic liberalism. Ozal himself had stated that he wished for a 
population that will be competitive in the global economic environment but also 
pious and respectful towards God. He wanted an Islamic Renaissance for his country 
but, at the same time, technological and scientific growth. In other words, he picked 
and mixed military and economic power similar to the western countries and, at the 
same time, Islamic faith and camaraderie that were found in the eastern Islamic 
states. In addition, one of his goals was to gradually integrate into the economy 
every person that belonged to the middle classed regardless of the region. 
(Moudouros, 2011, pp. 127-128) 
 These economic reforms contributed even further to the increase of Political 
Islam’s rise in popularity: They relaxed the state’s control over the economy and 
created a new category of businessmen that had their base in Anatolia cities. 
Because of economic development, a new middle class was created which had 
Islamic background. This new class supports liberal economic policies and the 
reduction of state intervention and was one of the main supporters of Erbakan’s 
Party. These reforms also resulted in the entry of capital from the Arabic world. This 
money helped further pro-Islam actors to reinforce their positions. In addition, 
religious associations are now free to operate and to open religious private schools 
and universities. Last but not least, they also gain their own media, their voice can be 
heard and their views can be communicated to the public. (Evaggelia, 2015, pp. 44-
45) 
 Linking Islam with state nationalism helped Erbakan’s Milli Gorus movement. 
Although Erbakan and his National Salvation Party were banned from politics after 
the coup, they emerged again as the Welfare Party and were able to attract even 
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more supporters because Islam now is active again in the public sphere.  This party 
was the continuation of the Mill Gorus movement and the next one representing 
political Islam, with the first one being Erbakan’s National Order Party. Poverty and 
social exclusion were fertile ground for the increased popularity of Political Islam. 
Initially, its leader was Ali Turkmen but Erbakan was eventually reinstated into 
Turkish politics and became the party’s leader in 1987, when Erbakan’s ban from 
participating in political life was lifted. At first they were protesting for the impact of 
Ozal’s neo-liberal policies but they changed their attitude: Their goal was to Islamize 
capitalism. They were talking about an Islamic economy, one that would act as a 
counterbalance to the western one. In addition, Erbakan wanted his party to come 
to power and aid the craftsmen and small businessmen of the periphery that were 
still isolated from the economy by the Kemalist, secular establishment. (Saleem, 
2017, p. 47), (Moudouros, 2011, pp. 171-172), (Antonios, 2016, p. 54) 
 Welfare Party participated in the 1987 elections but wasn’t able to enter the 
Parliament, it only received 7.2 percent of the total vote. (In Turkey, a party has to 
receive 10% of total vote in order to enter the Parliament) In the local elections of 
1989 Welfare Party managed to receive 9.8% of votes, capturing municipalities in 
several districts and electing many mayors, which shows that its popularity is 
increasing. In the October 1991 general elections, Welfare Party formed an electoral 
alliance with the far-right party of Turkes and they received together 16.7% of total 
votes, earning 62 seats in the parliament. During those elections the dominant party 
received 21.38% of votes and earned 158 seats. In general, the next decade will not 
be one of political stability for Turkey. Many of the governments formed are based 
on multi-party coalitions and Erbakan’s party participates in most of them, increasing 
Political Islam’s role and influence even further. Welfare Party wasn’t supported only 
by Islamists but by Kurds and Sunni communities. (Narli, 1999, p. 40), (Moudouros, 
2011, p. 172), (Antonios, 2016, pp. 54-55) 
 During the first years of 1990s, Political Islam’s popularity continues to 
increase.  This is shown clearly in the 1994 local elections Erbakan’s Party received 
19% of votes and elected mayors in 28 municipalities, including Istanbul and Ankara. 
It is important here to underline that the mayor that got elected in Istanbul was 
none other than Reccep Tayip Erdogan, the current President of Turkey and the most 
powerful man the country has ever known since Kemal Ataturk. Erdogan’s successful 
administration of Istanbul gave additional points to Erbakan’s Party, increasing its 
popularity even more. (Evaggelia, 2015, p. 45), (Antonios, 2016, p. 56)  
 The big step forward for Erbakan and his Party, and in extension Political 
Islam, was the 1995 national elections. Erbakan’s Welfare Party received 21.6% of 
total votes and it earned the greatest percentage of votes. A coalition was formed 
between Welfare Party and Tansu Çiller’s True Path Party in order to form a 
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government. The latter was vice-president of the government and Foreign Affairs 
Minister and Erbakan became, for the first time, Prime Minister. This development 
shocked Kemalists and military officers: It was the first time since the founding of the 
Turkish Republic in 1923 that Turkey is being administered by an Islamist Prime 
Minister and an Islamist Party. (Evaggelia, 2015, p. 45), (Antonios, 2016, p. 56) Of 
course, this is the best opportunity for Islamists. During this period, Political Islam 
supporters capture important positions in the state and gain great economic power. 
As a result, Kemalists started to worry about its increased activity and influence. 
(Moudouros, 2011, pp. 176, 178) 
 Many factors contributed to this increase of Welfare Party popularity. One of 
the most important ones was the Party’s focus on social matters. This allowed the 
Party to widen its appeal to more people, not only to the religious left. Also, poor 
people voted for Welfare Party because of many decisions taken in order to alleviate 
the poor who live in cities: This Party was really well organized in the Turkish political 
life, a legion of faithful Muslims, many of them being women, were working as 
volunteers for the Party and that resulted in the creation of a network that helped 
and took care of poor people. This network also helped its voters find employment, 
provided medical care, food and other social benefits. In addition, the Party was able 
to appeal to the electorate because of its anti-western rhetoric. The Turkish society 
during that time had negative feelings towards the western world because European 
Union didn’t approve of Turkey becoming a member state and thought that they 
were biased because towards their country. (Evaggelia, 2015, p. 46) 
 Nevertheless, Erbakan’s government wasn’t successful while tackling the 
many problems that Turkish society was facing. It was very difficult for him to both 
keep satisfied those who remain loyal to secularism (they were really sceptic 
towards him) and, at the same time, to not abandon his anti-systemic rhetoric. 
Striking a balance between these two proved too great a challenge for him. Instead 
of adopting policies that would reduce social tension, he chose to polarize even 
more the arduous situation. On the one hand he accepts the Customs Union with EU 
and he doesn’t cancel the Treaties with Israel, something which infuriates his 
traditional Islamic supporters, and on the other hand he infuriates Kemalists and 
military men with some of his statements and actions. Erbakan’s relationship with 
Muammar Qadhafi also made some suggest the Turkish prime minister might owe 
ultimate allegiance to Libya's leader, who also headed a secretive organization called 
the Islamic People's Command to which Erbakan also belonged.  In addition, 
Welfare’s call for lifting the ban on the veil for female university students and civil 
servants, Erbakan’s desire to build a mosque in Istanbul’s Taksim Square were some 
of the decisions that Erbakan and Welfare Party officials took that made military 
officers and secularists really worried that Welfare Party wanted to dilute the secular 
state. The Welfare Party's anti-democratic position on several issues also 
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disappointed secular public opinion. For example, Erbakan and Justice Minister 
Sevket Kazan made critical and insulting comments about people who took part in 
the "One Minute of Darkness for Enlightenment" civil protest in February 
1997.Women worried that their rights would be reduced. There were also 
allegations that the Party had connections with militant Islamist groups. Really 
important also was the fact that government officials tried to silence the Press. 
(Evaggelia, 2015, pp. 46-47), (Narli, 1999, pp. 42-43) 
 Because of all the above actions, the military chose again to intervene, like it 
did in 1960, 1971 and 1980. This time, however, military officers didn’t organize a 
coup. On 27 February 1997 the National Security Council, which is dominated by 
military officers, prepared a list of recommendations and handed it out to Erbakan. 
In essence, they wanted him to apply Kemal Ataturk’s reforms and stop activities 
that were against the secular nature of the state. Some of these recommendations 
were: The banning of the headscarf and to limit the accession of Imam Hatip schools 
graduates into Universities. Erbakan at first ignored these recommendations, then 
he agreed to implement them but he didn’t. Eventually, the army mobilized the 
secular part of the society against him. He was sent to the Constitutional Court with 
the allegations that he violated the principle of secularism and the law of political 
parties.1 The Court decided Erbakan’s ban from politics and his Welfare Party was 
outlawed in January 1998. (Evaggelia, 2015, pp. 46-47), (Narli, 1999, p. 43), (Incel, 
2017, p. 68) 
 This military intervention was different than the previous ones. This time, the 
coup was bloodless, the officers applied political pressure on the first Islamist Prime 
Minister in order to force him to quit and to ban him and his Party from Politics. 
That’s why this operation was called Post-modern coup. Again, the army intervened, 
showed its influence and authority and the citizens supported this intervention. In 
other words, a multi-layered political system intervened, Turks call it their political 
system but observers outside the country call it the Turkish Deep State. (Antonios, 
2016, pp. 57-58) 
 The February 1997 event was a really important event that affected the 
future developments in the country. It led to the abandonment of the idea that 
religion could be used for the stabilization of the society, which would be based on a 
Turk-Islamic mixture. The army began an anti-Islamist campaign, for those Islamists 
and their ideas, along with Kurdish nationalism, are the biggest threats for the 
security of the Turkish state. So, they purged the public sector from Political Islam 
members, with an emphasis on those who worked in the education, a list of 
                                                          
1
  This Law was promulgated by the junta on 25 April 1983. According to this law, new political parties 
are forbidden from having any connection with the parties that had been active before the coup. This 
law also specified that all parties must accept the principles of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his 
revolution. (Jenkins, 2008., p. 142) 
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businesses that had ties with the Islamists was formed (and encouraged everyone to 
boycott these firms) and reporters that criticized the junta were fired immediately. 
(Evaggelia, 2015, p. 56), (Incel, 2017, p. 68) 
 The coup also affected the Islamic movement. Its members understood that 
it was impossible for them to continue and succeed by pursuing a clear Islamist 
agenda because secularists and military officers would immediately intervene and 
stop them. As a result, many Islamists decided to continue their political movement 
by watering down their Islamist ambitions a bit because that way they will not have 
to face secularists. (Evaggelia, 2015, p. 56) 
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d. Political Islam. After the Post-Modern coup to 
Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party 
 On 17 December 1997, as it became clear that Erbakan’s Welfare Party would 
be banned, Political Islam actors were afraid that their voice would be silenced. In 
order for their struggle to continue and their voice to be heard, they found a new 
Party. This party was named the Virtue Party, which was the continuation of 
Erbakan’s previous Welfare Party, and its leader was Recai Kutan who was one of 
Erbakan’s closest men. Its inaugural congress was done on 14 May 1998. Despite 
Recei Kutan being the leader, behind the shadows Erbakan was controlling the Party 
although he was banned from politics. However, Recei Kutan and the other officials 
of the party found themselves on a difficult situation. On the one hand, if they 
continued their previous Islamist rhetoric they risked their prosecution and banning 
from politics. On the other hand, if their rhetoric and policies deviated too much 
from the previous incarnation of Political Islam Party, this could lead to the 
alienation of their supporters. In the end, the party opted for a more moderate 
image. They decided to avoid the Islamist rhetoric and they emphasized that they 
are committed to secularism, democracy and freedom of speech. Virtue Party even 
started appointing women who do not wear headscarves to its national executive. 
(Previous Islamist Party demanded women who were their members to wear 
headscarves) More importantly, Party officials stopped their anti-EU and their anti-
United States hostility and they started traveling to the west, to both European 
countries and the United States, in order to meet politicians and other officials and 
they were declaring that they wanted Turkey to enter the EU. Of course, they 
stopped talking about building alliances with Islamic countries and Turkey’s exit from 
NATO and the opening of Islamic banks is now an idea that belongs to the past. This 
thorough change is shown clearly in the Party leader’s statements. According to 
Welfare Party, Turkey wasn’t as Islamic as it should be. Now, Kutan and his Virtue 
Party state that Turkey isn’t as democratic as it should be. (Jenkins, 2008., p. 164), 
(Antonios, 2016, pp. 59, 61) 
 In general, Virtue Party stopped talking about an Islamic mission. Now, they 
focus on democracy, human rights and personal liberty. For them, the headscarf ban 
issue is a matter of human rights violation and suppression of personal liberties and 
not a religious one. Also, now for them the ideal state is the one that is democratic 
and not authoritarian and is in the service of the people. This again is contrary to 
Erbakan’s former party, whose desire was a holy state that stands above the people. 
(Narli, 1999, p. 44) 
 This new Islamist Party wasn’t homogeneous though. There were two 
different groups inside it and their views and ideas about the best possible strategy 
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differed. The first group was the traditional ones. These people have Kutan as their 
representative and they were opposed to any serious change in the strategy and 
policies that the party supported. In essence, Erbakan controlled this part of the 
party despite Kutan being typically in charge. The second group was the modernists 
or reformists. Their representative was Abdullah Gul (but in practice Recep Tayyıp 
Erdogan was the one pulling the strings). The modernists argued that the party 
needs to reassess its approach to matters such as democracy, human rights and 
relations with the western countries.  They also were opposed to Erbakan’s 
authoritarian leadership style and they wanted a more democratic party. (Evaggelia, 
2015, p. 57),  
 Virtue Party in 2001 was declared illegal because one of its women 
Parliament candidates attended the oath ceremony while wearing a headscarf. 
Immediately the prosecutor took action and the Party was declared illegal. 
(Antonios, 2016, p. 61) 
 After the banning, the traditional ones along with Necmettin Erbakan formed 
a new Party, the Happiness Party, while the reformist group found the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), a center- right coalition, which is still in office in Turkey 
today. In essence, what happened was the split of Milli Gorus movement into two 
separate parties. Those that remained loyal to Erbakan believed that their mission is 
to establish a new civilization based on traditional Islamic values and were unwilling 
to make compromises with the secular establishment to expand their supporters. Of 
course, they didn’t change their anti-Western rhetoric, they believed that Islam was 
incompatible with Western values and they were against Turkey entering the EU. 
Instead, for them the best possible outcome is Turkey intensifying their relations 
with the Arabic world. On the contrary, AKP founders had been members of the Milli 
Görüş movement but they were willing to cooperate with the secular establishment, 
accepts the fundamental values and constitution of the Turkish Republic and its 
officials have repeatedly emphasized that Western values such as democracy, 
respect for human rights and the rule of law are very important. Also, Western 
countries are very important strategic partners and they wanted Turkey to enter the 
EU. Actually, AKP views EU membership as a means of reducing the influence of the 
military and the Kemalist establishment and as a good chance of establishing a 
political framework that is tolerant to religious tolerance. That way, Political Islam 
will be able to survive politically. It can be said that the new party that Erdogan and 
Gul founded remain loyal to Political Islam but they had a different idea about how it 
could survive. 
 Nevertheless, this is an important ideological split: AKP defines itself not as 
an Islamic party but as a conservative democratic one that is similar to Christian 
democratic parties that are found in Western Europe countries. Traditionally, 
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Islamists were opposed to the West, rejected it and of course, they were against 
globalization.  AKP officials though understood that in order for Turkish economy to 
grow they had to attract capital from foreign countries and to carry on with IMF’s 
recommendations regarding the economy. So, AKP has promoted liberal market 
policies in order for Turkey to attract foreign capital and to integrate into the world 
economy. (Larrabee, 2008, pp. 46-47) 
 When AKP first appeared on the Turkish political scene, many were afraid 
that its officials had a secret Islamist agenda, to slowly turn the country into an 
Islamic one and to undermine secularism. It is true that some of the party officials 
were ideological Islamists but they were outranked by party leaders Abdullah Gul 
and Recep Tayep Erdogan who were supposed to be, according to their statements 
at the time, Islamists-turned- modern politicians and pragmatists that were 
promising democracy, religious freedoms, liberal market support and to tackle 
corruption. They abandoned Erbakan’s views about the economy, disagreed with 
Kemalists’ statism, they adopted liberal economic policies and they turned against 
state controlled economy and state intervention.  
 As a result, despite military officers and the Kemalist Republican People’s 
Party accusing them of wanting to change the secular nature of the state, most of 
Turkey’s elites didn’t see them as a threat to the Kemalist foundation. Instead, they 
viewed them as reformists that wanted to stop the stranglehold of Kemalists over 
the country’s political and economic life, to tackle corruption in state institutions and 
to promote democracy by strengthening rights and freedoms of expression and 
limiting the military’s power over civil affairs. Recep Tayip Erdogan has played a 
really important role promoting AKP. He managed to win the support of Turkey’s 
western-oriented and liberal elites. Their backing and support in general helped AKP 
to drastically increase their voters beyond the typical Islamist movement. (Antonios, 
2016, pp. 72-73), (Toledano, 2011 , p. 3) 
 Erdogan enjoyed also not only elites’ support but also citizens’. People loved 
Erdogan and his party; they believed that they are close to them and that they could 
understand them and sympathize with them. Even Kurds and leftists voted him. The 
former supported AKP because they believed that their life inside Turkey would be 
easier and the latter because he opposed Kemalists. (Antonios, 2016, pp. 66,70) 
 Ideological modernization and the adoption of a different political rhetoric 
contributed to AKP’s increase of its appeal. On the November 2002 elections AKP 
earned 34% of votes and 363 seats in the Parliament and won the elections, 
surpassing by far Republican People’s Party, the traditional Kemalist Party, which 
received 19% of total votes and 178 seats. Kutan’s and Erbakan’s new party received 
only 2.5% of total votes and failed to enter the Parliament. Of course, previous 
Political Islam voters supported AKP but the Party was able to attract votes from 
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other parts of the society too. As it can be seen in the graph below, AKP received 
considerably more votes than previous Islamic Parties. (Larrabee, 2008, p. 48), 
(Jenkins, 2008., p. 169) 
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 This new Party’s realistic and moderate tone appealed to a wider range of the 
electorate. Other factors that contributed to its victory were the corruption scandal 
revelations for many officials of old parties that became widely known. Contrary to 
the old, corrupt politicians AKP members weren’t corrupt and they were able to 
attract voters by capitalizing on the corruption scandals that older politicians were 
mixed in by presenting themselves as clean. Also, the really bad situation of the 
Turkish economy 2led many people to vote for AKP which was a new Party promising 
reforms, economic growth and political change. In addition, AKP managed to appeal 
to worker classes and to the poorer classes since leftists in Turkey didn’t have 
political activity. Suffice it to say, the party had really well organized social networks 
(the majority of them were found by Erbakan’s Welfare Party) which helped AKP 
increase their votes even more. (Larrabee, 2008, p. 48) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Turkish lira was devalued several times, the banking sector almost collapsed and GDP shrank by 
9.5% in 2001. (Larrabee, 2008, p. 48) 
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4. AKP in power: First years 
 As it has been written before in this current dissertation, AKP party members 
started their political career in the Milli Gorus movement, which is the movement 
behind Political Islam. Knowing this, the military, Kemalist establishment and their 
political opponents accuse them of having a secret Islamization agenda. Erdogan 
himself, as well as other AKP officials, openly stated that there isn’t a secret 
Islamization agenda. For them, their party isn’t an Islamist one and its members 
were simply “Muslim democrats” and not plain Islamists. (Moudouros, 2011, p. 306) 
The truth though is that AKP has completely cut its ties with the Milli Görüş 
movement and accepted secularism because, according to AKP officials, is a principle 
that “maintains peace among diverse beliefs, schools of thoughts, and perspectives.” 
Erdogan himself underlined that they cut any ties they had with this movement. In 
the party program secularism is depicted as a principle that assures the freedom of 
religion and conscience and rejects the “the interpretation and distortion of 
secularism as enmity against religion.” This new ideology is identified as 
“conservative democracy. “ Erdogan himself explained what conservative democracy 
stands for: It didn’t mean the conservation of established institutions but the 
protection of important values and principles while, at the same time, pursuing 
progress. For him, religion shouldn’t be used as a political instrument as it may be 
harmful for social peace, political diversity and even religion itself. AKP’s goal is to 
synthesize local and universal values, tradition, modernity and morality. (Kuru, 2007, 
p. 146), (Larrabee, 2008, p. 54)  
 There is a huge difference between a party that wants to change a society 
based on the religion without the citizens accepting this change and a party that just 
accepts religion and its values. That is what Erdogan claims.  AKP, according to the 
country’s newest politicians, belongs to the latter category. (Moudouros, 2011, p. 
234) 
 Regarding their relation with Kemalism, AKP officials criticized Ataturk’s 
ideology and stated it severs the Turkish society from its past and its traditional 
characteristics, including religion.  In other words, traditional culture and its values 
were missing. If society’s link with them would be restored then Turkey would be 
able to achieve both growth and modernization. (Moudouros, 2011, p. 238) Erdogan 
and the other AKP officials weren’t against Kemal Ataturk and his ideals though. They 
underlined that the Turkish Republic’s founder’s principles and reforms are the most 
important vehicle for raising the Turkish public above the level of contemporary 
civilization and an element of social peace. Where they disagreed with Kemalist 
establishment though is the interpretation of secularism. They rejected this version 
of secularism because there is enmity against religion. For AKP, secularism is defined 
as:  
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“A principle which allows people of all religions and beliefs to comfortably practice 
their religions, to be able to express their religious convictions and live accordingly, 
but which also allows people without beliefs to organize their lives along these lines.” 
 In addition, AKP wants to change the way secularism had been interpreted 
and applied by the Kemalist establishment. According to them, secularism is 
distorted by the Kemalists because they have enmity against religion. So, Turkey 
wasn’t truly secular.  What AKP wants is a truly secular country then, where 
everyone would be free to live practicing their religion freely. Suffice it to say, even 
those who don’t believe in God can live in the country normally and organize their 
lives without any form of discrimination.  In a way, Erdogan wanted the evolution of 
the Kemalist ideas, they didn’t reject Ataturk. That’s what they were claiming during 
that time at least. (Moudouros, 2011, p. 236), (Jenkins, 2008., p. 168) 
 During his first years as a Prime Minister, Erdogan repeatedly stated that AKP 
is committed to democracy, freedom of speech, clean government and promised 
that the party would be different from previous political parties in Turkey which 
have been dominated by their leaders. And he delivered: The party’s founding 
statutes limited the leader’s authority and included a large measure of 
decentralization. Also, he distanced himself from the radical ideals he had while he 
was a member of Erbakan’s movement and claimed that he had changed. (Jenkins, 
2008., p. 167) 
 Erdogan kept his word; AKP remained distant from divisive social issues.3 He 
declared that his government’s priorities were EU membership and economic 
stability and he was using the language of modernity as he realized the advantages 
of doing so. Having EU membership in his political agenda was seen as something 
positive and he earned the support by business cycles, pro-Western liberals and the 
public in general. The emphasis on democracy and human rights allowed the AKP to 
minimize the influence of the military4 and the Kemalist establishment in politics. 
(Larrabee, 2008, p. 51) Also, the fact that their stance and rhetoric wasn’t radical and 
extreme, contrary to the majority of the previous Turkish Islamic parties as well as 
similar parties in other countries gave them many points. Actually, their electoral 
success was possible because of their moderate stance. Some people, based on their 
point of view, believed that AKP’s stance is anti-Islamic and some others that they 
are becoming increasingly secular. Nevertheless, it is a fact that this new way of 
                                                          
3
 There was one exception though. AKP tried to establish a law that criminalized adultery. Liberal 
cycles and the EU criticize AKP and because of the controversy it caused the law was cancelled. 
Conservatives didn’t like this development.  (Incel, 2017, p. 117) 
4
 AKP took some measures in order to reduce the army’s intervention. They were able to do so 
because the EU supported AKP regarding this matter. Actually, from 2002 to 2004, Turkish Parliament 
voted 8 units of reforms, including some Constitutional amendments. With these reforms, the nature 
of the National Security Council changes, it is now ’politicized’. This means that military officers’ 
presence and influence in this institution is now limited. (Incel, 2017, p. 124) 
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moderate politics helped AKP survive and to be the dominant party. (Evaggelia, 
2015, p. 68) 
 AKP persuaded the electorate that it is a liberal and politically moderate 
party. Also, economic growth and stability that they brought after the disastrous 
economic recession of 2001 raised the party’s popularity even more. That’s why it 
managed to attract votes from many parts of the society, Erdogan and his party lived 
up to many of these liberal expectations.  It could be said that AKP proved to be a 
catch-all party. This can explain the increased vote percentages that achieved during 
the next elections that took place in 2007. (Evaggelia, 2015, pp. 60-61) It managed to 
earn 46.7% of total votes and 341 seats in the Parliament. This is a clear sign that the 
electorate trusted the AKP because they preferred the liberalism that Erdogan 
promised to Kemalist authoritarian perception. (Antonios, 2016, p. 76) 
 In the lead-up to the elections many, including the judiciary and military 
officers, accused AKP that it harbored a hidden Islamist agenda. Its popularity wasn’t 
affected though. Economic growth, AKP’s relatively clean governance, the absence of 
credible political opposition, their devotion in EU accession, their statements that 
they respect European Court of Human Rights and other International Institutions 
and the overall stability that was achieved led significant portions of the country’s 
liberals and pro-Western voters to trust them again. (Toledano, 2011 , p. 4), (Incel, 
2017, p. 109) 
 When assessing the electoral success of AKP, special mention must be made 
to Hizmet, the organization that Fettulah Gulen found. The latter is an Imam and 
Islamic preacher that resides in USA in a self-imposed exile because he was accused 
for anti-secular activities. His movement follows his teachings and is the largest 
Islamic network. Although it is an Islamic one it is moderate, they advocate dialogue 
with the other religions, accepts science and doesn’t argue that scientific advances 
and Islam are incompatible. This movement is very popular and large, it has millions 
of members in Turkey alone and it has also expanded in many other European and 
Asian countries. The movement controls a significant amount of financial resources: 
It controls many businesses, has its own media, schools, hospitals, insurance 
company and even its own bank.  It has been mobilizing mainly through its vast 
network in the education system which consists of hundreds of private schools, 
dorms and studying centers. Also, many important people are members like 
renowned businessmen, police officers, bureaucrats and even military officers 
despite them being secularists. It didn’t support Erbakan and radical political Islam 
though because his views were too radical and weren’t compatible with Gulen’s 
ideals. But because of AKP adopting a more moderate tone and because the version 
of Islam they supported wasn’t radical, the Fettulan Gulen movement and its vast 
and grand network decided to strengthen AKP party and to engage in politics.  So, a 
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grand alliance was formed during the first decade of the 2000s, which resulted in the 
initiation of a golden age for Islamic actors, which surely contributed greatly to AKP’s 
electoral success. On the one hand, Gulenists voting for Erdogan were an immense 
boost in AKP’s percentages, since this movement has millions of members and 
supporters inside Turkey. One the other hand, many of these people had important 
positions and they helped counter-balance the Kemalist establishment’s 
counterattack against AKP (for instance, the political influence of the military was 
halted) when the latter started became a serious threat. So, Gulen helped AKP 
consolidate its control over political institutions. In addition, this alliance was 
beneficial for Gulenists too:  Claiming that they represent civil Islam, until the AKP 
years, the movement avoided any confrontation with secularists and kept a safe 
distance from active politics and political parties in general, keeping a low profile. 
But aligning with AKP allowed the movement to obtain political influence in a more 
direct way and without much effort. Now, after many years of keeping a low profile 
and withstanding the suspicion of the political elite and the Kemalist establishment, 
now its honor has been restored and can operate openly and engage in politics. In 
sum, this alliance initiated a Golden Age for Islamic actors as it was extremely 
beneficial for both AKP and Fettulah Gulen. (Maria, 2011, pp. 24-25), (Demiralp, 
2016, p. 3) 
 This important victory in the 2007 elections wasn’t the only one for AKP. In 
April 2007 the Party nominated their candidate for the Presidency: He was Abdullah 
Gül, who was serving as the Foreign Affairs minister during that time. This decision 
was strongly opposed from pro-secular actors because he was a member of earlier 
Islamist parties (it was completely unacceptable for secularists to have an Islamist 
President) and because his wife wears a scarf which is viewed by them as a symbol of 
opposition to the secularism.  The military intervened too and mobilized the public. 
As a result, mass rallies took place in Turkey with the goal to “uphold secularism”. In 
major cities more than one million protesters gathered to prevent AKP to elect the 
new President. Nevertheless, on 28 August 2007 the Presidency elections took place 
and he was nominated President of the Turkish Republic. This of course shocked the 
Kemalist establishment and secularists in general. It was the first time in the history 
of the Turkish Republic that both the President and the Prime Minister are Islamists. 
This was a great victory of the Islamic movement against the Kemalist establishment, 
previously in the Turkish political landscape the President of the Republic 
counterbalanced the parliament that was dominated by the AKP: Because the 
President signs the appointment of high ranking generals and top civil bureaucrats as 
well as high court judges and university presidents, AKP’s impact toward state 
policies regarding religion was limited. As a result, because of this development, 
many of the non-Muslims were afraid that now AKP has the authority to impose 
radical changes to Turkey, they will start Islamizing the society. Erdogan tried to ease 
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their fears: After the elections Erdogan made a conciliatory speech, where he 
promised that his government will embrace all of Turkish citizens, secular or 
religious. (Jongerden, 2011 , p. 30), (Larrabee, 2008, p. X), (Kuru, 2007, p. 149) 
 Despite the controversy and the political crisis that was caused by the 
appointment of Gul, the matter was solved in a peaceful and democratic way and 
according to the democratic institutions. During that time AKP had a moderate 
stance and its officials didn’t want the situation to escalate. (Evaggelia, 2015, p. 73) 
 Soon afterwards, with the support of two more parties, AKP amended the 
Constitution. Now, the ban for the headscarf has been lifted, allowing women 
wearing a headscarf to study at the University or work in civil service jobs and 
government offices. For AKP, wearing the scarf is a matter of personal choice and is 
not something that the state should allow or ban via policies as its banning is a 
violation of human rights. Of course, the main opposition party, the Kemalist 
Republican People’s Party, didn’t welcome this change and took recourse to the 
Constitutional Court, where the amendment was annulled because, according to the 
judges, violated the principle of secularism as enshrined in the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, this wasn’t the end of this case as the chief public prosecutor charged 
the party with having an Islamization agenda that seeks to undermine secular state 
and to establish an Islamic one and called for AKP’s dissolution. In July 2008 the 
Constitutional Court decided not to ban AKP but by a margin of only one vote. They 
just issued a financial penalty and a warning because of some of its members’ 
activities and statements were viewed as contrary to the principle of secularism. 
(Jongerden, 2011 , p. 30), (Saleem, 2017, p. 48)  
 In the end, AKP remained in office, is more popular than ever since it 
received much more votes in the 2007 elections and the new President of the 
Republic is an Islamist, which means that Erdogan and Political Islam are more 
powerful than ever. However, secularists’ backlash that almost led to the dissolution 
of AKP worried Erdogan and he launched an attack on the Turkish deep state in 
order for him and his party to politically survive. After the 2007 elections, the 
minister of Interior Affairs, after being instructed by Erdogan, started a campaign 
against the Turkish deep state and the Ergenekon paramilitary network.5 The result 
of this campaign was the arrestments of many military officers, judges, reporters, 
academics and even renowned businessmen. Also, it became widely known that this 
network planned to overthrow the Erdogan government. Nevertheless, this case 
                                                          
5
 The Turkish deep state includes senior army officers, security services seniors, the top echelon of the 
state bureaucracy and leading members of the judiciary. They operate under a code of absolute 
loyalty to Kemalist principles and the republic. When the Kemalist state is faced with a crisis this 
organization reemerges and acts in order to defend and save the state and Kemalist principles. In 
order to do so, they overturn, if they have to, institutions and even governments if they have deviated 
from Kemalist principles which are considered to be sacred. (Toledano, 2011 , pp. 6-7) 
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ended with the victory of Erdogan and Political Islam against the Kemalist deep state. 
(Moudouros, 2011, pp. 317-319) 
 ΑKP’s and Erdogan’s power increased even more after the referendum that 
was held on 12 September 2010. This referendum marked the end of the hold of 
Constitutional Court and the military by the secularists.  It reduced the powers of the 
military and broke secularists’ control over the Constitutional Court which had lasted 
for 50 years. The composition of the Constitutional Court was changed and 
democratic governments were given more powers. Also, the power of the military 
over civilian matters was decreased. Now, civilian courts can try military personnel 
as the latter do not enjoy the protection that the coup leaders of 1980 had. Also, the 
powers of the military personnel were decreased. These changes didn’t bring Islam 
into the Constitution of course but made it possible for a political party to do so in 
the future should it manage to gain the support required. (Saleem, 2017, pp. 48-49) 
  AKP remains dominant in the Turkish political field. During the 2011 
elections it received 49.83% of total vote, and it was the first party. AKP’s position 
and power is consolidated since almost one of two Turks vote for AKP. One of the 
main reasons for the increasing popularity of the party is the economy. After 10 
years that the AKP is in government the country’s GDP almost tripled. Poverty was 
drastically reduced ( those who lived under the poverty line reduced from 30% of 
total population to 7% in the period from 2002 to 2008), Turkey’s public debt had 
been reduced too and, as a result, more money was spent for health and education, 
a new middle class was created because many people were able to work, earn and 
participate in the economic life due to economic growth, Turkey was also able to 
repay IMF loans and enter the G20( Turkey entered the club of the 20 countries with 
the highest GDP internationally) and was able to attract foreign investors. But, 
despite the impressive performance of the economy the situation isn’t as positive as 
it first appears to be. Results have shown that Turkey was split in two. On the one 
side AKP supporters have formed conservative Islamic elite. On the other side, the 
other half of the population was Turkey’s secular part which feels threatened by the 
other sides’ rise and consolidation of power.  That’s why many voices are raised that 
Erdogan’s government would become an authoritarian and totalitarian one that aims 
in the creation of an Islamic society. It is true that the authoritarian regime of the 
Kemalist establishment received a heavy blow by AKP and its members but many in 
Turkey are afraid that this will not lead to a more democratic and liberal society. It 
will just lead to the replacement of an oppressive regime with another similar one.  
(Antonios, 2016, pp. 82-83), (Filis, 2017, p. 41) 
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5. Is the secular state in a process of change? 
 As argued earlier, Erdogan and the AKP officials were promising a truly 
secular and democratic society where everyone would be able to live equally and 
practice their religion freely without any form of discrimination. In addition, they 
were repeatedly claiming that they don’t have an Islamist agenda. Their goal was just 
to stop the anti-religious tendency that Kemalists imposed on the country because, 
according to them, it is undemocratic and unfair for pious Islamists who feel 
oppressed in their own country. After the passing of years and many electoral 
victories, AKP’ power and popularity has been consolidated and Recep Tayip Erdogan 
is the dominant one inside Turkey and the most powerful man the country has even 
known since the years of the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
himself. So, now is the time for the big question: Did Erdogan’s policies resulted in a 
democratic and liberal country or, on the contrary, he made an authoritarian turn? 
And, last but not least, does he attempt to change the secular state by Islamizing the 
society and undermining Kemal Ataturk’s reforms?  
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a. Erdogan’s authoritarian turn. 
  Despite talking about the democratization of Turkey and human rights 
and the creation of a truly secular and liberal society, only after a few years 
after the consolidation of AKP in power Erdogan’s political behavior changed 
dramatically. During the first years, the Kemalist establishment and his 
political opponents tried to defame AKP. They accused the party that they 
aim to Islamize the society and they mass mobilized the people against it, for 
instance during the Presidential elections of 2007. Soon after, during the 
Constitutional amendment regarding the headscarf ban lift, the AKP was 
almost banned and that would mean the end of Erdogan’s political career. 
During all those incidents, the disputes were resolved in a moderate tone and 
according to the laws and Institutions.  
 But, soon afterwards Erdogan started changing his stance and he 
begun hunting down and purging those who could pose a threat, initiating a 
witch hunt. For instance, in 2010 two reporters were arrested, Ahmet Sik and 
Nedim Sener with the allegations that they ‘were part of the Ergenegon 
terrorist organization’. But the truth is that they wrote a book in which they 
reveal the connections that the Gulen movement has in the judiciary and the 
police, who have started the fight against ‘terrorists’. Also, in the same year, 
a few weeks after the Constitutional referendum of 2010, Hanefi Avtzi got 
arrested with the allegation that he is collaborating with Far- Left terrorist 
organizations. Erdogan himself approved of these arrestments and even 
claimed while talking in front of the European Council that the arrestment of 
Sik and the seizure of his hand-writings are a preventive measure, similar 
with the seizure of a hand-made bomb!  
 The witch hunt continues in August of 2011 with the arrestments of 
around 100 military officers with the allegation that they were preparing a 
coup. On the autumn of the same year, many intellectuals that were 
members or just supporters of the Peace and Democracy Political Party got 
arrested. Their crime was their involvement with Kurdish terrorists. (Incel, 
2017, pp. 175-178) 
 The year 2013 is a turning point for AKP and Erdogan. The party now 
is consolidated, opposition parties cannot pose a threat and military officers, 
because of the previous witch hunts, are now completely harmless. Erdogan 
is now extremely powerful and he and his party have the police, the judiciary 
and the secret services under their control. In addition, most media are AKP 
supporters. (Incel, 2017, p. 182) Of course, in previous years there were many 
indicators that Erdogan has authoritarian tendencies and he isn’t an ardent 
fan of democracy and liberalism but one that wants to gather all 3 powers in 
his hands (Executive, Judiciary and Legislative) and he is aggressive towards 
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his opponents and criticizers. These suspicions became a reality after the Gezi 
park events. On 28 of May a tree removing operation has started on the Gezi 
Park. Erdogan’s initial plan was the removal of the park. In its place, a large 
shopping center would be constructed. Soon after the start of the operation, 
a small group of ecologists gathered there and protested for the destruction 
of the park and the removal of trees. Immediately policemen came and used 
violence in order to force them to leave. Soon after, because of the violence 
that the police used, thousands of protesters gathered in the streets near the 
Taksim Square (it is located near the Gezi Park). They weren’t protesting only 
against the destruction of the Gezi Park. They were also protesting against 
AKP and Erdogan’s authoritarian government and conservative policies and 
its interference on personal lifestyles by attempting to impose a way of life 
compatible with the Sunni Islam morals (more about that later). Erdogan 
wants to create a conservative society with Islamic values and he tries to 
impose his ideal way of Islamic, pious and moral society into everyone. As a 
result, everyone in Gezi Park and Taksim Square protested because they were 
opposed to these Erdogan’s policies. Protesters had a mixed background: 
They were in large percentage young people, middle classmen, supporters of 
the secular state and even Alevis. The latter feel threatened from the 
undermining of secular state that Erdogan does with his policies. Protesters 
want AKP officials to respect democracy and their own way of life. In 
addition, they show their disagreement to Erdogan’s crazy construction 
projects like the third Bosporus Bridge and the construction of a third airport 
in Istanbul.  
 Erdogan responded in a violent way. After about ten days, the police 
was ordered to suppress the protesters. They used violence is order to 
succeed. But protests continued and they started to appear in many cities 
throughout the country. 7 people were killed by police force. In the end, 
Administrative Court decided the cancellation of the Shopping center 
construction and the protests stopped. The incident ended but it was clearly 
shown that Erdogan has abandoned the moderate tone that has shown 
during his first years as Prime Minister, doesn’t accept criticism and, of 
course, one that doesn’t accept democratic principles. He is also a populist: 
He stated that the Gezi Park protests weren’t an expression of Turkish people 
but were organized by enemies of Turkey worldwide. (Incel, 2017, pp. 188-
191) 
 In other words, AKP and its officials are now above the law and they 
can do whatever they want. On 17th of December of 2013, it became widely 
known that many AKP officials, including Ministers and other high- ranking 
officials, were mixed in economic scandals. Police officers, judges and 
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prosecutors that began research about this case were demoted, transferred 
to other cities of forced to resign. (Incel, 2017, pp. 194-195) 
 Nevertheless, things in Turkey became much, much worse after the 
July 2016 coup. Erdogan believes that Fettulah Gulen and his movement 
organized the coup in order to overthrow him.6 After the failed coup, 
Erdogan and his government responded fiercely.  More than 50.000 people 
were arrested, more than 140.000 people that were working in the public 
sector as judges, police officers, teachers, reporters or academics lost their 
jobs. Their crime was, according to AKP, their collaboration with Gulen in 
order to overthrow Erdogan and AKP. In addition, more than 1000 firms were 
confiscated and media that were considered to be opposing to AKP or 
controlled by Gulen were forced to close. In general, after the coup the 
political landscape in Turkey changes dramatically. Now, any opposition or 
criticism to the government of Erdogan himself is immediately suppressed: 
People that speak against him are considered to be terrorists and sent to jail. 
Those who are Erdogan’s enemies are also enemies of Turkey and need to be 
taken care of. Also, the President initiated a purge against military officials. 
Those who are secularists and are against Islamization of the society lost their 
positions. Erdogan is above the law and the institutions and can surpass them 
and do whatever he wants. He doesn’t hesitate to criticize judges, for 
instance, when they decide something that is against his interests despite the 
principle of the separation of the 3 powers being in effect in Turkey. (Filis, 
2017, pp. 10-12), (Antonios, 2016, p. 95) 
                                                          
6
 This alliance between Fetullah Gulen’s movement and AKP didn’t last long. While it isn’t easy to 
explain the reasons of this break-up there are some events that shed some light and possibly can 
explain it. The first turning point was the secret meeting in Oslo between the head of the National 
Intelligence Organization, Hakan Fidan, and PKK representatives, the armed Kurdish organization that 
had been fighting Turkish security forces since the 1980s. This meeting sparked controversy in Turkey 
and oppositing parties criticized AKP. Along with the other criticizers, Gulenists raised their voice as 
well. This was the first time that they criticized Erdogan since they started cooperating. The next 
turning point was the Gezi Park protests. During that time, the Gulenists didn’t support Erdogan but 
remained neutral. In a polarizing political environment sometimes neutrality is considered to be 
opposition and that’s exactly what happened in this case too, Erdogan didn’t like their stance 
regarding this matter. Afterwards, AKP began to attack the Gulen movement. In November 2013 AKP 
officials announced their new education policy, which included the shutting down of all study centers 
which prepared students for university entry exams. This was a blow to Gulen’s movement since it 
had many study centers and these were the Organization’s means for mobilizing people. Softliners 
from both sides tried to not let things go out of control but in the end hardliners dominated. Their 
between relations became even worse when many government officials were mixed in economic 
scandals: Tapes were released from anonymous sources implicating AKP members. The latter accused 
Fettulah Gulen for these tapes and their circulation and they claimed that they are fake and that 
Gulenists plan to overthrow the government.  In the months that followed, AKP officials continued 
the attacks on Institutions and Organizations that had ties with the movement.The last nail in the 
coffin was the 2016 coup. Erdogan himself accused Gulen for the planning of the coup and initiated a 
witch hunt in order to get rid of his Organization and to silence its members once and for all. 
(Demiralp, 2016, pp. 3-5) 
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 Nevertheless, Erdogan is the dominant one in the Turkish political 
field but only in practice. In theory, laws limited Prime Ministers’ and the 
Presidents’ power and the principles of checks and balances as well as the 
separation of powers were active in Turkey. In other words, institutionally 
there was a limit in President’s power. But this changes after the Referendum 
that took place on the 16th of April 2017. It was decided that the Constitution 
would be amended and the President would receive increased powers. Now, 
the President is the dominant and most powerful official in Turkey. The 
position of Prime Minister is abolished and the government is being 
appointed by him. There is now need for the latter to receive the Confidence 
Vote from the parliament. Also, the President appoints Ministers, high 
ranking judges and he is the main bearer of executive power. In addition, he 
can issue decrees and no one, not even the Legislative power can check him 
and counterbalance his authority.  In other words, earlier Erdogan surpassed 
institutions and laws and was able to do what he wanted. Now though, he 
amended the Constitution in such a way that he can continue ruling in the 
exactly same way the country without being above the law. (Filis, 2017, pp. 
11-12) 
  As it has been already explained in this current research, 
Erdogan has a completely different behavior as a ruler during the latter years. 
While observing the political situation in Turkey, is essential to review 
Freedom of Press in the country because it is a very good indicator of how 
democratic a country is. In addition, in the case of Erdogan and Turkey it has 
increased importance: If Erdogan represses Press and sends to jail reporters 
who criticize him and, on the contrary, the only media that can operate 
undisturbed are the pro-AKP ones then that means that Erdogan can distort 
the truth and present his own version of events. Suffice it to say, if that is the 
case, it will be much easier for him to influence public opinion and promote 
his own political agenda: If he has a secret Islamization agenda it will be much 
easier for him to succeed and change the secular nature of the state. 
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b. Freedom of Press in Turkey 
 Erdogan was never a strong supporter of an independent and free 
Press. Even a few years ago, when he hasn’t shown yet his authoritarian 
tendencies, he has openly shown his dislike of reporters who criticize him. In 
fact, in 2010, while he was talking to some party members he has said that 
everyone should know his place and his limits (he was referring to reporters) 
and he warned them to not speak against him and his Party.  
 Erdogan very soon took action. Not only he criticizes opposing media 
but he also boycotts them. He asked people to boycott them because ‘they 
work for foreigners and their interests’. Actually, one of his targets was the 
media network that belongs to the businessman Aydin Dogan. Some of the 
reporters that were working for him criticized Erdogan, AKP officials and their 
actions. Immediately after the decision of the judiciary of 2008 where the 
AKP almost got banned from politics, Aydin Dogan faced the consequences. 
Tax officials checked them and decided that they are guilty of tax- evasion 
and they had to pay around 4 billion dollars. Dogan was forced to sell part of 
his business to pro-government businessmen. (Incel, 2017, pp. 169-171) 
 Repression of the Press was always existent during AKP’s rule but the 
last years, after the failed coup of 2016 and the state of Emergency that 
followed, the situation became much worse. It is almost impossible to 
present news on the country on a normal and objective way, as the reporters 
are supposed to be doing. Workers in media have two choices: Either to give 
the pro-Erdogan version of the news or to not give them at all. Those who 
don’t do as AKP officials say pay the price: They are arrested immediately and 
sent to the court with the allegation of insulting President Erdogan and/or 
collaborating with terrorist organizations and face dozens of years’ worth of 
prison time. Prosecutors and judges have an increased workload as they have 
tens of cases to prosecute. (Ahval, 2018) Details about these arrestments are 
shocking. Journalists were sent to jail without receiving a trial and, in most of 
the cases, without being issued an indictment. The indictments began being 
issued around a year after their initial capture and their trials are now 
starting to get under way. Some notable cases are thirty employees of the 
daily newspaper Zaman – 20 of whom have been held for nearly a year – will 
finally begin being tried in Istanbul on 18 September. Some of them face the 
danger of being imprisoned for a life sentence. (Borders, 2017) 
 Turkish journalists of course tried to fight back. They are turning to 
the European Court of Human Rights and they ask the Institution to intercede 
on behalf of the journalists that have been detained. The Court responded 
almost immediately and started working on some cases. (Borders, 2017) 
After a few months, the Court has reached a decision: After examining the 
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cases of two reporters (their names are Mehmet Altan and Şahin Alpay), it 
calls Turkish Government to release them because that have been wrongfully 
imprisoned after the 2016 coup. European Court argued that these people’s 
detention was neither “necessary” nor “proportionate” and that it violated 
their “right to liberty and security of person” and their “right to freedom of 
expression.” (Borders, 2018) 
 In general, acquisition of media enterprises by Erdogan and his 
supporters is a practice that started a few years ago and continues even 
today. One of the greatest and more worrying examples is Aydin Dogan’s 
enterprise and its fate. As stated in the previous paragraph, Dogan became a 
target of Erdogan and his supporters in the past but that was not the end of 
it. A few months ago, on 21th of March 2018, it was announced that Dogan 
media group was bought by Demirören Holding, who is a pro-government 
conglomerate. This is a truly worrying development since Dogan media group 
was the biggest media group in Turkey, having the daily Hürriyet, the 24-hour 
news channel CNN Türk (a joint venture with CNN), the news agency DHA, 
the English-language Hürriyet Daily News, the TV channel Kanal D and the 
tabloid Posta. Demirören on the other hand is a businessman who is known 
for having close ties with Erdogan himself. There is no need to say that with 
this takeover Erdogan now controls the majority of media enterprises and 
can control the news and the information published. About 90% of them are 
now pro-AKP. (borders, 2018) According to journalist Ayşenur Arslan, Dogan 
was forced to sell his enterprise under the threat that he would be sent to jail 
should he didn’t comply. (Öncü, 2018) 
 The Government attempts to control online streaming news sites too. 
According to a new law that appeared this year, online streaming news sites, 
which are now very important since traditional media are almost entirely 
controlled by Erdogan, in order to operate need to receive the approval from 
the government broadcast monitoring agency if they wish to receive the 
necessary license. (Ahvalnews, 2018) 
 In general, AKP attempts to control and to suppress the flow of 
information in general, not just from media websites. Since 2014, AKP 
censors the internet: It closes websites that posts information or images that 
are opposed to the government and Erdogan’s policies and actions. From 
time to time, many websites and social media platforms have been 
periodically proscribed or restricted by the authorities, who claim to do so in 
order to battle terrorist groups. For instance, the well-known online 
encyclopedia Wikipedia is completely inaccessible since April 2017. In 
addition, around 220.000 websites are blocked by the government. (Sabanci, 
2018) 
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 The results of all these actions are really noteworthy. Since the July 
2016 coup attempt Erdogan and his government have forced more than 175 
news outlets to shut down and more than 12.000 lost their jobs. Right now, 
unemployment in journalism is among the highest rates of all sectors, 
according to the Turkish Statistical Institute. As a response, independent 
journalism is on the rise in Turkey right now. Many journalists attempt to use 
social media platforms in order to continue working as journalists and to 
make their voice heard. Their aim is to present an alternative to the majority 
of media which are almost completely controlled by Erdogan. (Zeren, 2018) 
 In sum, Recep Tayip Erdogan was never in favor of independent 
journalism. He always tried to hunt down and get rid of media outlets that 
criticized him but the situation became much worst after the failed coup of 
2016. After that, a real witch hunt began in Turkey. Opposing media outlets 
are forced to close, hundreds of reporters were sent to jail and they being 
kept there without being issued an indictment and Erdogan now controls 
almost all media. Indicative of this situation is the ranking that Reporters 
Without Borders give about freedom of Press in Turkey. The year 2015 
Turkey was ranked 149th among 180 countries-a very low score. After that, 
Turkey’s rank becomes even worse. The ranking for 2016 was even lower, 
151 among 180 countries and it became even worse in 2017: Turkey’s current 
rank is 155 among 180 countries. Turkey is without any exaggeration a giant 
prison for journalists and one of the countries with the less media freedom in 
the world. (Borders, 2017) 
 
 
 
  
 
Journalists protest. In the labels that they hold is written: We want justice, freedom to 
newspaper workers. 
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c.Turkey and European Union. Is Turkey 
continuing EU rapprochement and reforms? 
  It has already been established that Erdogan has deviated from 
democratic procedures, has gathered all powers in his hands and he suppresses 
press, not allowing any voice that criticizes him or counterbalances his Party. The 
only actor left that can apply pressure on him is the European Union. So, before 
assessing if Erdogan tries to Islamize the country and the society, it is essential to 
examine if Turkey continues the necessary reforms in order to join the Union. If 
Turkey’s politicians have deviated from EU path then EU officials’ 
recommendations and pressure will have no effect on them, leaving them free to 
proceed with their plans about altering the Turkish state and society in general. 
 Turkey, on theory at least, is a candidate country for joining the EU and AKP is 
a pro-EU party that supports EU accession and entering the EU was one of its 
main goals when it was first elected on 2002. On the side of the EU, the 
conditions for becoming a member state rest mainly on Copenhagen Criteria. So, 
Turkey is expected to achieve stability of institutions that guarantee democracy, 
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. EU 
Institutions and its officials for year have monitored Turkey’s progress in these 
fields. (Toktas, 2006, p. 490) The European Council granted Turkey the status of a 
candidate country in December 1999 and Ascensions Negotiations were initiated 
in October 2005.  Despite the Turkish government expressing their commitment 
to EU accession, their actions do not match their statements. Necessary reforms 
have actually stopped. According to European Commission’s most recent report, 
key recommendations of the Council of Europe and its bodies have yet to be 
addressed. For instance, the report underlines that the judicial system isn’t 
independent from political pressure, is at an early stage of preparation and there 
has been serious backsliding in the last two years after the failed coup and 
initiation of the State of Emergency: The recent Constitutional amendments 
regarding Council of Judges and Prosecutors entered into force and further 
undermined the judiciary’s independence from the executive power. 
(COMMISSION, 2018, pp. 2-4) 
 Regarding the fight against corruption, the report states that although there 
is some level of preparation no progress has been achieved in the last years. 
Turkish policy makers need to try harder in order for the legal and institutional 
framework to align with the standards set by EU. Turkish institutions do little in 
the fight against corruption: They allow influence by the executive in the 
investigation and prosecution of high-profile corruption cases and the country’s 
track record in these fields remain poor. As a result, corruption remains 
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prevalent in many areas and it is very high, both the actual corruption and the 
perceived one. (COMMISSION, 2018, pp. 4-5) 
 Regarding corruption, Transparency International’s Report agrees with EU’s 
arguments.7 Turkey’s corruption levels remain extremely high and also have the 
tendency to increase. This can be clearly seen on the corruption scores for the 
country. (The smaller the grade the greater the corruption is)  
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Corruption 
Score 
49 50 45 42 41 40 
 Source: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 
 
 It can be clearly seen from the values that Turkey always has been very 
corrupt. There has been some improvement for the year 2013 but after that the 
score drops. In essence, after AKP’s and Erdogan’s consolidation in power, the 
concentration of powers in the latter’s hands and their authoritarian turn, it can 
be seen that corruption increases even more.  
 In theory, Turkish legal framework guarantees human and fundamental rights 
but they have been further challenged and undermined by a number of 
emergency degrees passed during the last 2 years during the state of emergency: 
Because of them, there has been a serious backsliding in the freedom of 
expression too which is a field that Turkey is actually at an early stage of 
preparation. During the state of emergency, legal action has been taken against 
reporters, academics, human rights defenders and activists, writers and social 
media users. The internet law and the general legal framework enable the 
executive to control and block online content without a court.  
 In the areas of freedom of assembly, freedom of association and property 
rights there was serious backsliding too. Freedom of assembly continues to be 
restricted both in law and practice. Also, there wasn’t any progress regarding 
rights of the most vulnerable groups. Gender based violence, discrimination, 
hate speech against minorities, hate crimes and violations of human rights of 
                                                          
7
 Transparency International is a Non-governmental organization whose aim is to tackle corruption. It 
is a global NGO that has its base in Germany, has many chapters in many countries and its goal is to 
tackle corruption and promote transparency. In order to do this, Transparency international members 
tries to inform about the phenomenon of corruption and its negative effects on economy and society 
and cooperates with politicians and partners of businesses and civil society in order to develop anti-
corruption strategies. In addition, every year it measures the corruption in each country, a score is 
given that ranges from 0 to 100. 0 means full corruption while 100 means full transparency.  
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gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender persons are still common. (COMMISSION, 
2018, p. 6) 
 In sum, government officials and policy makers in Turkey show clearly that 
they do not abide by EU rules and recommendations. AKP and Erdogan have 
stopped reforming the country in order to adjust Turkey’s institutions to EU 
standards. Of course, they state that they want Turkey to join the Union but the 
reality is completely different. What’s important for this current research is that 
Erdogan doesn’t hear EU’s criticisms and ignored the reports produced by its 
Institutions. He does whatever he wants without being checked by anyone. 
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 As established in the current research, Turkey’s ruler now rules the 
country in a really authoritarian way. Since defeating its domestic rivals and 
establishing its control over the judiciary and the military, the AKP is in a 
better position to put in place laws of his own choice. His opponents are 
silenced, media are almost entirely controlled by him and his people and he 
know controls all 3 powers. Erdogan also completely ignores EU institutions 
and their criticisms. He is the most powerful man Turkey has ever seen since 
Ataturk’s time. So, if he has an Islamization agenda, it will be much easier for 
him. But, is it the case? Does he want to Islamize the society and to change 
the secular state? 
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d. Interference on personal lifestyles 
 As stated in a previous chapter of this current research, Erdogan 
wanted to correct the flawed secularism of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and 
wanted a society where everyone, regardless of their lifestyle and religion, 
could live peacefully. According to the official AKP’s program, secularism is  
 
“A principle which allows people of all religions and beliefs to comfortably 
practice their religions, to be able to express their religious convictions and 
live accordingly, but which also allows people without beliefs to organize their 
lives along these lines.” 
 Having in mind what he was promising back in 2002, when he first 
became Prime Minister, everyone would expect that AKP officials would be 
tolerant and not intervene on Turkish citizens’ personal lifestyles.  
 The truth is completely different though. With the exception of 
Kemalists who always felt anxious with the rise of a party whose members 
where previously members of Milli Gorüs, most of Turks, according to polls, 
didn’t feel that government officials were trying to interfere on their personal 
lifestyles or, at least influence them. This started to change though in 2013. 
(rosaTi, 2015, p. 151)What Erdogan has been doing is the promotion of the 
Islamic way of life by using the Western Institutional structure: Actually, AKP 
officials have been forcing Islamic values on the society and they state that 
they are doing so because they believe in the western principle of protecting 
the human rights of the oppressed pious citizens. But the truth is that 
Erdogan wants to create a new, pious society where the ideal image of a Turk 
is the Muslim who believes in God and respects Him and prays five times a 
day and he doesn’t consume alcohol. Erdogan’s vision for the country is 
grand and takes time in order to become reality. He wants a new pious 
generation to be created which, given enough time, will become the majority 
and become consolidated. In other words, it is a slow but steady Islamization. 
It is both an up to down procedure and a down to up one. (Filis, 2017, pp. 24-
26)  
 In order for this plan to succeed, in order for this new, pious 
generation to be created, AKP officials chose an indirect way. Instead of 
imposing Islamic laws that are according to Islamic teachings, they try to 
enhance the role of religion in everyday life by providing incentives. For 
instance, alcohol consumption and its selling aren’t forbidden but it is 
forbidden by law for shopkeepers to sell it after 22.00 and to put them on a 
display if their store is located near schools or mosques. (Filis, 2017, pp. 24-
27) It is also forbidden to promote or sponsor any alcoholic drink; products 
like these are blurred out in television shows. Because of the high taxation, 
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alcoholic drinks are very expensive, now account for two thirds of the cost of 
some alcoholic drinks and some Turks prefer to brew the drinks themselves 
because of the very high prices. (Tuvan Gumrukcu, 2017)Also, a new channel 
has been found by the Turkish public television which broadcasts in the 
Arabic language (Ataturk himself made the use of Arabic forbidden). 
Television programs shown promote the traditional image of a woman-
housewife that stays inside the house. More signs of this new lifestyle that is 
imposed is the lift of the ban of the headscarf and the new standard for 
women’ looks that is promoted- for instance, women working for the Turkish 
Airlines are discouraged from wearing rouge with intense red color and from 
dressing in a provocative way, otherwise they risk losing their job. Equally 
worrying is the way that the police and the judiciary have been dealing the 
last years with domestic violence. Instead of prosecuting the perpetrator, 
sometimes a murder is labeled suicide and the perpetrators receive lenient 
punishment. Sometimes, in rape cases perpetrators receive reduced 
punishments because the victim was considered to be dressed in a 
provocative way. (Filis, 2017, pp. 24-27)  
 Erdogan clearly has shown his beliefs regarding morality and the place 
of women in society. For him, men and women aren’t equal, cannot do the 
same jobs and he underlined that AKP rejects the western idea for women’ 
rights: The ideal thing for Turkey is to formulate their own version of women’ 
human rights. Also, he has stated that he doesn’t like the idea of a woman 
working, praised woman for their ability to give birth and underlined that her 
place is in the house, taking care of the children. A woman who neglects her 
family in order to pursue a career is one that has lost her femininity, gave up 
on humanity and is deficient. He recommends women to have at least 3 
children and harshly criticized those who use birth control measures. When 
criticized about these views he replied that he doesn’t oblige by law anyone 
to do anything, he just recommends what he believes is the ideal and right 
thing to do for the good of Turkey and its people.  
 As anyone can imagine, AKP officials have repeatedly stated that they 
are against abortions too. According to Erdogan, there isn’t a difference 
between killing a child after its birth and inside the belly of its mother. It’s 
exactly the same act. But in this case, they didn’t just state their opinions but 
they acted too: In 2012 the AKP government passed a law that restricted 
abortions. Now, an abortion is permissible only if it is done within the first 
ten weeks of the pregnancy. Afterwards, if a woman undergoes an abortion 
and there aren’t important medical reasons then the law proposes 
punishment. So, if a woman wants to stop her pregnancy, she has to go to a 
private hospital, where this service is very expensive. (Saleem, 2017, pp. 146-
148) 
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 In addition, government officials changed radically the education 
system in order for the children to receive Islamic education. These policies 
and trends that AKP officials promote were one of the reason that forced 
people to protest and shout “Enough already!” during the 2013 protests in 
the Gezi Park of Istanbul. (Incel, 2017, pp. 188-189) 
 There are many more examples that show that Erdogan and the other 
AKP officials try to create a pious, conservative Islamic society. On January of 
2018, the Turkish Radio and Television Supreme Council fined television 
channel over footage that show girls dressed in shorts. It ruled that the 
footage had violated its ethical broadcast regulations and fined the channel 2 
percent of its advertising revenues, amounting almost to 1 million lira which 
is around 200.000 euros with the current Turkish lira value.  This move is 
likely to anger secularists who accuse the government and Erdogan that they 
try to roll back secularism. (Solaker, 2018) In addition, recently Erdogan 
stated that now is a good time foe Turkey to start considering criminalizing 
adultery. This wasn’t the first time that Erdogan considers tackling adultery. 
In 2004, during his first years as a Prime Minister, his government tried to 
formulate a law that criminalized this act but it was abandoned because of 
the fierce reaction from the opposition and EU.  Now though the situation is 
entirely different for Erdogan and is a good time to consider passing such a 
law because “society is in a different position with regards to moral values”. 
In other words, Erdogan believes that Turks pay more attention to moral 
values after all these years of AKP being in government. He even went that 
far saying that he made a mistake when AKP heard EU and abandoned this 
law back in 2004. (Solaker, 2018) 
 Another example is AKP’s decision for Turkey to not participate in the 
Eurovision singing contest because some of the participants are LGTB. This, 
according to AKP officials, clashes with Turkish values. Of course, this isn’t a 
matter of grave importance but this shows that conservatism and intolerance 
gains ground in Turkey as time goes by, especially if we take into account the 
fact that AKP officials spoke against LGTB communities despite promising a 
secular and democratic society about 15 years ago, when AKP first came in 
power. (Ahval, 2018) 
 One new law got passed from the parliament on November 2017. This 
law sparked controversy and fierce opposition by the secularists. Now, 
Turkish religious officials can register marriages that are approved and 
considered official by the state. In the past, marriages conducted by religious 
officials not only they weren’t considered official but were illegal. On 2015, 
the law that banned marriage from Imams was annulled but these marriages 
weren’t still recognized by the state:  Only state registrars working for local 
municipalities were previously authorized to approve and register marriages. 
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In other words, previously religious marriage was forbidden in Turkey but 
now is allowed and approved by the state, which also indicated a policy 
change regarding religion. Muftis’ responsibilities will include granting 
applications, preparing marriage documents, conducting the marriage, 
arranging the family registry, and notifying civil registry authorities. 
(Ahvalnews.com, 2018) This law was heavily criticized by political opposition, 
secularists and activists because, according to them, it would allow polygamy 
and child marriage, it could allow legislation on the future that would 
undermine women rights and in general increase religious pressure on 
society. Also, they underlined that this law was formulated without the 
participation of people that would be affected by it such as women’s groups. 
(Ahvalnews.com, 2018), (Saleem, 2017, p. 147) 
 In general, in Islamic non-secular countries, sharia law (which is the 
official law of Islam) blends with state power and it imposes Islamic practices 
on the public, for instance everyone is obliged to not eat or drink anything 
during the day during Ramadan. Of course, those who don’t respect Sharia 
Law are punished. In other words, Sharia law draws its power from 
governmental mechanisms. What about Turkey? Truth be told, because of 
the reforms brought by Kemal Ataturk, Turkey’s case was completely 
different. Sharia law was left out of the public sphere and citizens didn’t get 
punished by saying or doing something contrary to Islamic teachings.  
 In recent years though, after Erdogan became Prime Minister and AKP 
consolidated its position, things started to change. Recep Tayip Erdogan and 
his government have begun sanctioning individuals that insult Islam. Since 
November of 2017, the national police, which are controlled by the AKP 
government, have started monitoring comments regarding religion posted 
online. A new unit was found with the task of observing online behavior and 
acts like weapon sales, violence against the animals, insult of the state or 
religion will result in the police prosecuting the perpetrators. When they find 
comments that are considered to be offensive to Islam they suppress 
freedom of expression. Also, it isn’t uncommon for the police to arrest those 
who speak critically of Islam in public: For instance, Fazil Say, who is a world-
renowned pianist, has been prosecuted twice with the allegation he 
commented on Islam in a provocative way. Actually, what Fazil Say did was 
make gentle fun of the everyday call for prayer on Twitter. In addition, 
Turkey’s state controlled television channel, TRT, harshly criticizes those who 
are not typical Muslims and do not take part in Islamic principles. In June 
2016, the channel hosted Muslim theologian Mustafa Akar, who sail during a 
live broadcast that those who don’t pray according to the Islamic practices 
are animals. Last but not least, government officials impose restrictions on 
public behavior: They criticize provocative women’s dress, public kissing and 
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state that men and women shouldn’t hang out together in entertainment 
areas, suggesting that mixing of men and women is unethical (Toledano, 
2011 , p. 8), (Cagaptay, 2018) , (Cumhuriyet, 2017) . Another good example is 
a public announcement that had been posted in a subway station in the 
municipality of Ankara, asking from passengers to behave according to moral 
codes. One of the main targets was young people who ‘act in an 
inappropriate way kissing each other’. (rosaTi, 2015, p. 151) 
 More recently, on the last days of 2016, many high ranking officials, 
including mayors, government institutions and non-government 
organizations, started attacking those who celebrate the New Year: The 
former asked them to not celebrate. Diyanet officials spoke against the 
celebrating of New Year and claimed that it is illicit for the pious Muslim 
people of Turkey. Immediately, banners discouraging people to participate in 
the celebrations appeared in Istanbul: These banners show a Muslim, 
bearded man punching Santa Claus. In addition, Muslim newspapers issued a 
harsh warning, calling everyone to not celebrate. In general, despite the vast 
majority of Turkish population being Muslim, celebrating the New Year and 
drinking alcohol wasn’t a major issue. But now, after all these years of AKP 
being in power, the mentality has clearly shifted. Now Turkey is much less 
tolerant. What’s really interesting though is the reaction of government 
officials after the terrorist attack that took place in Reina club of Istanbul 
during the Christmas Eve. They claimed that it was the work of extremist 
leftists. (Basaran, 2017) 
 Summing up, AKP officials, despite of their promises when they first 
came in power, openly intervene in the lifestyles of citizens and they want 
them to change their behavior in order to be faithful to Islamic laws.   
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In this banner is written: We are Muslims, NO to Santa Claus, NO to New Year celebrations 
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e. Diyanet and its importance 
 Diyanet, or the Directorate of Religious Affairs, is the most important 
institution in Turkey regarding the Islamic religion. Because the objective of 
this current research is to assess whether the secular state changes, it is 
essential to observe the status of the Organization during the last years and 
the stance of AKP government towards it.  
 The Diyanet was found by secularists during the reforms that made 
Turkey a secular country. The institution gained constitutional rank in the 
aftermath of the first coup in 1960. In 1971, the year of the second coup, the 
Directorate’s prayer leaders and preachers were made civil servants. 
Moreover, the law governing political parties that forbids expressing the 
demand for a change in the Directorate’s status, freezing the current 
situation, was passed in the aftermath of the last military takeover in 1980. 
(Saleem, 2017, p. 167) 
 The Organization mainly has two functions. It administers the 
(steadily increasing) 77.000 mosques that exist around the country and 
produces religious knowledge, regarding the Islamic religion, especially the 
Sunni part of Islam, which is the version of Islam that is worshipped in Turkey. 
It also supervises the muftis, which are Islamic scholars who give legal 
opinions. 8 It has no relations with the other version of Islam of the other 
religions worshipped by the other religious minorities in the country. This fact 
is a paradox. Turkey, after the founding of the Turkish republic and the 
reforms that Kemal Ataturk envisioned, is a secular country. This means that 
the state must be equidistant from all religions and not favor one in 
particular, which doesn’t happen in Turkey, since many religions like the one 
that is worshipped by Jews and Christianity aren’t managed by an official 
institution. Diyanet also is supposed to not mix itself in politics but 
sometimes its officials do, for instance during the headscarf controversy they 
supported the right of any woman to wear it for religious reasons. 
 Also, the Diyanet administers Islamic religious education. For this 
purpose, it organizes the operation of Imam Hatip schools, which are schools 
that provide Islamic religious education and trains future clergy and muftis.   
Also, it is responsible for the functioning for any of the country’s 20 faculties 
of theology. (Larrabee, 2008, p. 12) 
 The Institutions’ status and influence undoubtedly increased during 
the years 1980 to 2000, but the true important changes happen during the 
AKP rule. In 2010 a new law passed regarding the Diyanet and became 
                                                          
8
  Each of Turkey’s 81 provinces and 900 districts has a mufti. All muftis and Imams are state 
employees.. They are educated in the Imam-Hatip schools, state religious-education institutions, and 
in any of the country’s 20 faculties of theology. (Larrabee, 2008, p. 12) 
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operational that resulted in numerous significant changes: The status of the 
Diyanet was raised to the level of the undersecretary. Also, now the 
Institution has the right to establish its own television and radio channels. Its 
mandate was expanded: Now it can provide its religious services outside 
mosques, including, for example, in institutions such as hospitals, prisons, 
retirement homes, and women’s shelters. In addition, now its officials can 
issue halal certificates, a function that secularists couldn’t even imagine 
before 2010. (Saleem, 2017, p. 179) 
 In the current period Diyanet’s influence increases even more and its 
status is more respected from high ranking politicians. In 2012, President 
Abdullah Gul was the first president in more than 30 years to visit it. In 2014, 
Ahmet Davutoglu, after becoming Prime Minister, raised the stature of the 
Diyanet: Now, the head of the organization would report directly to him and 
not to a minister in his office. This clearly shows that for AKP officials it is an 
institution of grave importance that is placed in a high position in their 
agenda. Shortly after, President Erdogan raised the status of the head of the 
Diyanet in the state protocol list, now he is above in the list of many of the 
cabinet ministers. Erdogan declared that the head of the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs is a position as important as the Pope! Also, its increased 
importance is made apparent because many political parties take in into 
account. For instance, in the parliamentary elections of June 2015, 
Republican Peoples’ Party promised that they would keep the Diyanet above 
politics if they won. On the other hand, People’s Democratic Party wanted to 
abolish it. AKP declared that they would promote it even more. Suffice it to 
say, the organization was mired in a serious controversy: Some European 
governments accused its imams of spying for Turkey.  According to reports, 
imams that are active in various European countries who answer directly to 
the Diyanet have gathered intelligence from 38 countries, including the U.K. 
This is another clear sign that the Organization’s influence and power 
expanded tremendously with the blessings of high ranking government 
officials. (Saleem, 2017, p. 181) 
 The Diyanet’s budget also has been increasing steadily since the 
1950s, but the increase after 2010 has been significant and unprecedented. 
In 2014, the budget of the Directorate has been around 1.24% of the 
country’s total GDP, one of the highest levels ever achieved. For 2019, the 
budget is set to increase even more: It will be increased by an additional $ 
850 million (5 billion liras) boosting its budget from $1.3 to $2.1 billion for 
2019. This means that its funding will increase for about 34.36%. This 
increased funding comes at the cost of the country’s Science, Industry and 
Technology Ministry’s budget, which will be cut by around 56% for the 
following year. (Saleem, 2017, p. 179), (t24, 2018) This clearly shows that AKP 
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officials and Erdogan himself consider this institution to be of utmost 
importance, since deciding to increase government spending on this 
particular institution, especially in the current period (2018 winter) that 
Turkish economy is in a really bad situation. 
 Also, the number of personnel that are employed by it increased 
tremendously. From 2010 to 2014 the number has increased from 84.000 to 
around 120.000. More recently, according to a new presidential decree 
published in Turkey’s Official Gazette during the first days of November 2018, 
Diyanet’s personnel will increase by an additional 8,489 new positions. 
(Saleem, 2017, p. 179), (Welle, 2018) 
 Diyanet members and officials are forbidden by law to engage in 
political activity and support any political party. But it is clear that they want 
to get mixed in politics.  Recently, they applied to the country’s highest court, 
Constitutional Court, to ease these restrictions. The court voted unanimously 
against the proposal to reform the law. However, the Diyanet is still 
determined to change this law and, according to reports, has amassed 
lawyers and other legal experts in order to try again, showing that they really 
want to be politically involved. (Tartanoğlu, 2018) 
 Nevertheless, the institution until 2010 stayed out of politics. But, 
despite failure to reform the law about Diyanet’s involvement in politics, its 
personnel didn’t stay neutral. It has clearly supported Erdogan and his party. 
For instance, during the coup of July 2016, its mosques mobilized people to 
go out in the streets and support Erdogan. This mobilization of the masses 
was one of the reasons that military officers failed to overthrow Erdogan and 
resulted in him initiating a state of emergency, during which he purged his 
political opponents and became even more powerful. In addition, Diyanet has 
been assisting AKP in its foreign policy: As stated earlier, its vast network of 
mosques across many European countries, especially Germany, influenced 
Turks living there to support and vote for Erdogan as well as collect 
intelligence on his opponents. (Cornel, 2017, pp. 32-33) 
 So, during the AKP years Diyanet’s importance is increased as well as 
its annual budget and its personnel. But what about the nature of this 
institution, are its people progressive or are they conservative Islamists? For 
most of its history, the Diyanet had embraced the principle of secularism and 
adopted a more moderate version of the Islam that accepts secularism and 
modernity and that has nothing to do with fundamentalism. But today’s 
reality is completely different. Taking advantage of its newfound political 
power, the Diyanet has begun issuing orders to introduce elements of sharia 
law to the Turkish society. Recently, in a fetwa that they released, Diyanet 
declared that men must use only their right hand to eat and drink because, 
according to its officials, men cannot be left handed; only demons can and 
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those who were born left handed should switch sides. The reason for this 
fetwa is because humanity must follow the example of the prophet 
Muhhamad, who used only his right hand for such actions and because he 
pointed out that those who are left handed are demons. In January 2018 the 
organization published another fetwa that is even more alarming: Under 
Islamic law, girls as young as 9 years old can marry, become pregnant and 
give birth! Because of the public outrage Diyanet withdrew this statement 
and declared that it was just pointing parts of the Islamic law and not 
recommending it. Even more recently, the head of Diyanet, Ali Erbaş, stated 
that everyone, especially children, should study the Quran because “a heart 
that hasn’t embraced and accepted the Quran is a dark heart that is open to 
Satan and its influence.” He underlined that children should start studying 
the Quran after they become 7 years old, because during that age they start 
shaping their character. So, that way, they will grow to be pious and faithful 
Muslims. Also, the Directorate of Religious Affairs discouraged everyone from 
celebrating the western New Year because it is against Islamic faith. Judging 
from these fetwas and statements that their officials have made, it looks like 
that Diyanet moves close to a hardline interpretation of Islam. (Asani, 2018), 
(Economist, 2018), (Sincar, 2018) 
 Summing up, the Diyanet , or the Directorate of Religious Affairs, is an 
Institution that during AKP’s years grew in importance and influence. Its 
budget (that is a percentage of the country’s GDP) has risen significantly as 
well as its personnel and it can now influence people much more easily since 
it has its own television and radio channel. Also, it issues fetwas on demand 
and gives advice via a free telephone line. The fact that AKP and Erdogan 
place such importance to a conservatist institution that embraces such a 
hardline version of Islam is an additional sign that Erdogan and the other AKP 
officials want to create an Islamic society, changing the secular state.  
 As stated earlier, one of the main functions of the Diyanet is the 
training and education of muftis and Islamic clergy. The latter are trained 
though the imam Hatip schools mainly. So, because education is so important 
for a country, since it directly influences the future citizens and, in extent, the 
future society, it is necessary to review the status of the Imam Hatip schools 
during the last years. If there are policies from the government aiming to 
increase the number of these schools and the number of their students, who 
will receive Islamic education, then this will be an additional sign that AKP’s 
policies aim to Islamize the society.  
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f. Education and Educational policy during 
AKP’s years 
 Undoubtedly, education is extremely important for a state. It directly 
affects the future generations and the contemporary reality in a state and 
society because the official education provided by the state will form the 
characters, beliefs and culture of the country’s future citizens and, in extent, 
the society in general. Having this in mind, researching about education 
during AKP years is essential. If Turkey’s Islamic government really has an 
agenda of Islamization and wants to Islamize the society then it is highly likely 
that part of their policy making would be amending the education in order to 
produce more citizens with a strong Islamic background.   
 Islamic education is provided mostly through the Imam-Hatip schools. 
They are schools that train future Islamic clergy and muftis and they were 
found during the reform period of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk after the banning 
of the previous establishments of such nature, medressas. Initially, 29 Imam 
Hatip schools opened, which had around 2250 students in 1924. However, 
they quickly got reduced and after a few years all of them had been 
converted into public schools because religion was banned from education. 
The official explanation was that there hadn’t been public demand for them 
but the truth is that they were shut down because the officials didn’t want 
the citizens to receive religious education. After the introduction of multi-
party democracy, the schools started to operate normally.  More than half of 
the lessons in these establishments are religious in nature. Some of the 
subjects taught there are the Quran, the Prophet Muhhamed’s life and 
sayings, Arabic and other subjects relevant with the Islamic philosophy and 
holy law. The remaining lessons follow the normal national curriculum. This 
mixed curriculum was state approved. In general, girls attending these 
schools wear the headscarf, which is considered to be an emblem and symbol 
of Islam.  Secularists view these educational establishments with suspicion 
and sometimes with fear because they believe that those who study there 
are cultivated first and foremost as a pious Muslim believer and only 
secondary as a Turkish citizen. Of course, they were always afraid of the 
danger of the retreat of secular state which Kemal Ataturk created. (Akpinar, 
2007, pp. 162-163), (Saleem, 2017, p. 203) 
 The Imam Hatip schools had always some level of restriction. The last 
remaining restrictions were removed by the army officers who organized the 
1980 coup. As it has already been established, their goal was to re-introduce 
religion into the social sphere in order to counterbalance communism and 
other radical ideologies. Now, students attending these schools could now 
enter all university faculties the exact same way as any other high schools 
70 
 
student. Also, the authority, prominence and acceptability of all faculties of 
theology have been increased. The number of these religious schools 
increased from around 350 to 605 during the period from the early 1980s to 
1998 and the number of students increased from 200.000 to more than 
500.000.  
 After the post-modern coup of 1997, religion and Islamic actors were 
targeted. Imam-Hatip schools had the exact same fate. They were considered 
to be training grounds for Islamists. With the reforms that were introduced, it 
was made very hard for those who graduate from these schools to enter 
university faculties: According to the reforms, graduates could access similar 
faculties to the high schools that they attended. Otherwise, they would suffer 
a penalty in their grade, which means that they have to achieve very high 
grades. In other words, Imam Hatip graduates could only access religious 
faculties except if they achieved very high grades, much greater than the rest 
students that graduated from schools. The argument for this change was that 
now the graduates would be able to work on their own field. Another anti- 
Imam Hatip measure was the scrapping of the first three grades of the 
preacher schools. Also, the number of Imam Hatip schools and their students 
was drastically reduced. In 1998 around 605 were operating but by 2003 only 
450 were active. The number of students was reduced from 511.500 in 1998 
to a measly 64.534 in 2003. The military argued that Diyanet couldn’t absorb 
so many employees, so they had to drastically reduce the number of schools 
in order for the youth to not be unemployed. (Saleem, 2017, pp. 211-212), 
(Öktem, 2011, pp. 106-107) 
 AKP was committed to eliminate discriminations against Imam-Hatip 
school graduates. Once it first won the elections, in 2002, AKP attempted to 
remove the restriction, sparking a major controversy, but failed because the 
military, the judiciary and the President Sezer himself disagreed and opposed 
this policy. In the second half of 2003 AKP tried again to remove these 
restrictions but failed because the military interfered again. After winning the 
local election on March 2004, AKP policy makers passed a law that aimed to 
end this discrimination but the law was scrapped as President Sezer vetoed it. 
Because of these interventions, few new Imam-Hatip were opened between 
2002 and 2009. The number of students though more than doubled, from 
71.000 it rose to 198.000. In general, it can be seen that since coming to 
power, Erdogan had religion in his political agenda and wanted to increase 
the influence of these institutions.  
 In 2007, after winning in the parliamentary and Presidential elections, 
the AKP, because it consolidated its power and its officials were feeling that 
they were in control, started increasing the number of these schools. In 2003 
their number was 450 and in 2010 were 465. Also, in 2009 they were finally 
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successful in removing the discrimination against Imam-Hatip school 
graduates. They could now enter any university faculty without any 
restriction. The result of this change was immediately seen: Enrolment, which 
was really low before, increased dramatically. During the year 2009-2010 
around 200.000 students enrolled. At the same time, Quran courses run by 
the Diyanet started to increase too.9 By 2010, around 200.00 people were 
attending these courses. These increasing figures show the results of AKP 
policies that clearly aimed to increase the role of the religion to everyday life. 
(Saleem, 2017, p. 212) 
 In fact, AKP high ranking members openly state that they want to 
increase Islamic education in order for the citizens to receive education of 
such nature. Erdogan declared that he wants to raise a devout, pious 
generation, based on Sunni Islamic values and teachings. He argues that such 
education is essential for the formation of citizens’ characters because it had 
helped in the fight against violence, racism, terrorism, drug addiction and 
even anti-Semitism. Likewise, Turkey’s former minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Ahmet Davutoglu, defended AKP’s educational policy by saying that it is 
essential for Turkish citizens because that way they will be able to control 
and process the unhealthy information about the religion that is abundant 
and is a source of radicalization in the countries that have the same borders 
with Turkey. (Saleem, 2017, pp. 214-215) 
 In the following years, Imam-Hatip schools number continues to rise.  
The number of Imam-Hatip secondary schools increased from 1099 in 
2012/2013 to 1361 in 2013/2014 and 1961 in 2015/2016. Likewise, the 
number of Imam-Hatip high schools rose from 493 in 2010/2011 to 704 in 
2012/2013 and to 1149 in 2015/2016. It is especially interesting to keep in 
mind that many of these new Imam-Hatip schools were formerly normal high 
schools that provided secular education. When asked, government officials 
don’t give an exact number of secular schools that got turned into imam 
hatip. But what is known is that hundreds of schools that had ties with the 
Gulen movement got seized by AKP and got turned into religious schools.  In 
general, many of the normal schools had been converted to schools that 
provide religious education. (Saleem, 2017, p. 215) , (Ahvalnews, 2018) 
 According to the Turkish news website sendika.org, just in the  
academic year 2016/2017, 250 new imam hatip schools opened, costing 
around 2.2 billion Turkish liras. (Sendika, 2017) AKP’s goal for 2018 was the 
opening of an additional 128 schools. (Arakon, 2018)   
                                                          
9
 Those who enrolled in 1980 were around 60.000, while the number increased to 158.000 by 1996, 
showing the results of the religion rapprochement policy that Kenan Evren and the other military 
officers initiated. However, after the post-modern coup declined to less than 80.000. (Saleem, 2017, 
p. 212) 
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Source: https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-erdogan-education/ 
 
 As it can be seen on the graph above, Imam Hatip number has been 
greatly increased during the AKP years. When this Islamic Party came to 
power, only 450 were active but now, 16 years later, are more than 4.000. 
(Gall, 2018) 
 Not only the number of these schools increased, but also the 
percentage of total government spending in order to fund them did. The 
National Education Ministry’s budget for 2018 has increased by 7 billion 
Turkish liras (around 2 billion American dollars) to more than 92 billion 
Turkish liras. From that budget, the percentage spent for the Diyanet 
increased by 68 percent. Out of the 7.7 billion lira that was to be spent for 
religious education, 6.6 billion will be spent for covering imam hatip schools 
expenses. This means that one quarter of the entire budget for middle 
schools will be spent on Imam Hatips. The 645.000 students that study in 
these establishments, who are around 11% of the country’s students, will 
receive a 23% share of this budget, which is twice the amount spent for 
students that study in regular schools. In fact, 12.500 liras will be spent for 
each Imam Hatip student, while for the other students, that attend schools of 
secular nature, the state will spend just 7.000 liras. (Arakon, 2018), 
(Cumhuriyet, 2017) 
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Source: https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-erdogan-education/ 
 
 It is clear from this graph that for 2018 the amount of money spent 
for religious education is much greater than the amount spent for regular 
one, showing that the AKP, by policy, wants to reinforce education of this 
nature. In other words, they promote it.  
 So, it is clear that since 2012 the number of these schools greatly 
increased as well as the budget spent for these. Because of this policy that 
clearly promotes and benefits imam hatips, Erdogan has been accused by 
secularists that he wants to create a devout, Islamic generation, undermining 
secularism. However, AKP policy makers, (one of them being Nabi Avci, 
former minister of education) have defend this policy by claiming that this 
increase was because there is public demand for these schools: In other 
words, they claim that conservative parents, who were feeling marginalized 
because they are pious Muslims, want their children to study there, which is 
an environment safe from drugs that will teach them Islamic morals. AKP just 
claims that they put a stop to the violation of these peoples’ rights.  Also, 
they claimed that no one is forcing anybody to send their children there. 
Since 2012, the education provided by these schools extended to middle 
schools for students that are between 10 and 14 years old and, as a result, 
more than 1.3 million children study there today. (When AKP won the 
elections in 2002, only 65.000 students attended these schools)  (Saleem, 
2017, p. 216), (Yeginsu, 2014) 
 However, many protest for this support that is provided to Imam 
Hatips. The expansion of religious education exasperates them and they 
argue that because many schools get turned into religious ones, it is 
becoming increasingly harder to find a school to send their children to. For 
instance, in August 2014, the Yesil Bahar Secondary School in Kadikoy, one of 
Istanbul’s more liberal districts, was among hundreds of secular schools 
converted to religious ones. Parents staged protests, and the conversion was 
reversed. (Yeginsu, 2014) Likewise, on the Asia side of Istanbul, there is a 
school complex, named Sarigazi middle school witch has been operating for 
60 years and is a non-religious school that is located in an area that has 
strong Alevi and secular presence. Nowadays, a large part of this school’s 
premises has been converted into an Imam Hatip school. A group of parents 
didn’t welcome this change. They claim that the change happened gradually, 
beginning several years ago with a few guest religious classes which 
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expanded over time. Now these classes have over 1.300 students, 
encroaching on the building where some 3,000 students study in a regular 
middle school. The parents want to stop the conversion of this historic school 
into a religious one and they even petitioned education authorities. Their 
point is that it is wrong to force Islam on people against their will. Parents 
complain that their children, who do not attend religious courses, receive less 
support than Imam Hatip students and that their classes are more crowded, 
sometimes reaching 40 pupils in a classroom. According to Reuters, officials 
declined to comment about this incident. 
 Another example of a regular turned into an Imam Hatip is the 
Mahmut Kemal Inal middle school which is too located in the Asian side of 
Istanbul. This time, parents failed to prevent it from becoming an Imam 
Hatip. They organized protests and even a petition, which was signed by 
hundreds of people, but to no avail. The schools operated as an Imam Hatip 
for the academic year 2017-2018. Parents claim that they don’t want the 
school to become a religious one and that officials completely ignored their 
voices when they protested showing their opposition to the conversion. 
Officials say a completely different story. According to them, the local 
community wanted the conversion and they welcomed it. But, according to 
reports, only 125 students enrolled in September, which is a low intake. This 
fact contradicts authorities’ claims that parents wanted the school to become 
Imam Hatip, the low enrolment rate is a proof that this kind of schools isn’t as 
popular as officials claim, many parents didn’t want to send their children to 
such a school. (BUTLER, 2018) 
 There are many more examples of course. Again in Istanbul, in 
Besiktas, one of the known districts of the European side of Istanbul, one of 
the schools there too got turned into an Imam Hatip, despite the parents 
protesting and trying to stop the conversion for more than two years. 
Another example is in Acibadem, a middle-class district on the Asian side of 
Istanbul. Parents heard rumors that the school was going to be demolished 
and that in its place an Imam Hatip would be constructed. The principal 
dismissed these rumors and assured them that this was a lie. But the 
demolitions did happen.  
 Parents that are against the conversion mass protested with the 
slogan “Don’t touch my school”. These protests gave rise to a movement, the 
movement for Secular, Scientific Education, which coordinates people from 
around 20 cities around Turkey.  
 There have been many reports that in many municipalities regular 
public schools aren’t available because all of them had been turned into 
religious ones and parents are forced to either send their children to private 
ones or to technical and vocational schools. (Gall, 2018) 
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In the label it is written: We are not going to deliver our children to darkness. Don’t touch my 
school! 
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In this label it is written: We own our future. Our schools should not be sold, should not be 
converted! We want a secular, scientific, free education! 
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           Newspaper Sozcu reports that despite the non-stop increase of Imam-
Hatip schools, a very large percentage of students’ spaces in these 
establishments, around 69%, remain vacant despite the governments’ 
pressure for parents to send them in these schools. This report contradicts 
the AKP officials’ claims that there is a huge demand for religious education 
than needs to be covered. Actually, for the academic year 2017/2018, 
according to official statistics from the Ministry of Education, 68.7% of spaces 
of Imam Hatip schools remain vacant. For technical and occupational schools 
the demand has been higher, around 44.9% of positions weren’t covered. 
The regular grammar schools, known as Anadolu lisesi in Turkish, have the 
highest demand; only 1.6% of positions weren’t covered. As it can be 
deduced from these figures, despite of AKP officials claiming that there is a 
strong demand for religious education, Imam Hatip schools have been the 
least popular choice for children when selecting where to go to study. 
Parents are really reluctant to enroll their children there. But things aren’t so 
simple. In many municipalities there aren’t enough grammar schools. For 
instance, Istanbul’s Kagithane district, where around 440.000 people live, 
there are only 2 grammar schools and 6 Imam Hatips. In that case, parents 
have to choose between technical and occupational schools or private 
education, if they want their children to receive secular education. The 
second option isn’t always easy, as the fees are sometimes really high. As a 
result, those whose income isn’t high are forced to send their children to 
occupational schools, where the education provided is second rate compared 
to grammar schools. (UYGUN, 2018) In other words, not only the demand for 
religious schooling isn’t high but it is an unpopular choice. Erdogan’s policy 
though insists promoting them, which clearly shows that he wants future 
citizens to have a strong Islamic background. 
          Despite their low popularity, AKP policy makers try to increase these 
schools’ attendance. According to a guide that explains Turkey’s newly 
implemented examination system for entrance to high schools, students who 
graduate from middle schools, when selecting choices online for the high 
schools that they desire to study too, are obliged to choose at least one of 
the available Imam Hatips. Otherwise, they will not be able to gain access to 
the next page, which lists the “quality” high schools. Of course, this means 
that some of these children will find themselves studying there. In addition, 
Ministry of Education plans to place around 25% of the best students in Imam 
Hatips. This is a part of the new education reforms drafted based on 
President Erdogan’s orders.  Of course, many citizens, secularists mainly, 
criticized these measures and stated that Erdogan undermines secularism. 
These moves are also proof that there is a policy by AKP for the increase of 
the number of children who will be taught Islamic values, which will result in 
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the future citizens becoming an Islamic one. (arabnews, 2018), 
(Sputnik.news, 2018) 
        Even more worrying are the claims of the Turkish Atheist Association. 
According to them, thousands of families have applied to this organization in 
order to ask for their help in getting their children out of compulsory religion 
classes. Parents hesitate to ask for their children’s exclusion themselves 
because they are afraid. The prevailing atmosphere of fear stops them, they 
are afraid that they or their children will be blacklisted and they will lose their 
job. (Bişkin, 2017) 
        Regarding the content of the provided education, students who study at 
Imam Hatips will be taught the national curriculum but around half of their 
courses are religious: Students will learn about the Prophet and his life, the 
Quran, Arabic language and Islamic values in general. In addition, even 
children who don’t attend these schools have increased religious teaching. 
Formerly, they had only one hour each week but the government has 
doubled it to two hours. Also, the restructuring of education curriculum, 
resulting to a new system that includes 3 tiers of four year schools, greatly 
expanded the amount of time students spend receiving religious education. 
Regarding the conservative nature of the people teaching there and the 
provided education in general, there have been reports that teachers advice 
more mature girls to not dress in a provocative way and to embrace Islamic 
teachings in order to evade a terrible fate. The announcement of the new 
curriculum raised even more suspicions.  In Turkey, Darwin’s theory of 
evolution will not be taught at high schools any more. Only university 
students who study a relevant science will hear about it. The official 
explanation is that the theory is too difficult for younger students to 
comprehend. In reality, this theory is rejected by Muslim creationists.  (Gall, 
2018), (BUTLER, 2018), (Gumrukcu, 2018), (Karataş, 2018) 
  
        Accordıng to Feray Aytekin Aydoğan, the General Manager of the 
Educators and Scientists Union (Eğitim-Sen), Turkey’s largest trade union, 
Turkish schools have been completely given to religious communities. 
Ministry of education enters into direct agreements with these religious 
communities and sects and funds them. These agreements are permanent 
and they cannot be cancelled even if the members of these communities are 
found guilty for serious crimes like physical and emotional abuse, sexual 
abuse, assault, or even rape. They were first entered in 2012 but nowadays, 
after the state of emergency that followed the 2016 July coup, have become 
even more widespread and common. For instance, the Ensar Foundation, 
which is an Islamist group, has become an important part of today’s 
educational system in the country. Another such group is TÜRGEV, which has 
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direct ties with Erdogan and members of his family. These groups are known 
for their conservative views. The books published by them frequently contain 
hate speech directed at adherents, other religions and people with different 
beliefs, identities and thoughts. Also, even though mixed education is 
accepted by the law, which law also applies to Imam Hatips, children are 
separated by sex. This separation has become a common practice in religious 
schools. Those who are in favor of this separation, conservative Islamists and 
AKP supporters, argue that it is the right thing to do and that mixed classed 
are against nature. AKP officials, who are responsible for this practice, 
defended this policy by claiming that students that attend gender specific 
classes are more academically successful and they even claimed that having 
gender specific classes is a right and that mixed education violates it! 
(Karataş, 2018), (Haber.sol, 2016) 
        Recently, on the first days of December 2018, Turkish Education Ministry 
approves a project, which first started by a religious foundation, to have a 
prayer room in every school across the country, according to the Turkish 
news website Oda. The project will start by installing prayer rooms in 90 
schools throughout Istanbul and will be funded directly by the Ministry of 
Education. (Odatv, 2018)  
        Finally, it is essential to underline that religious communities can open 
new, religious type schools easily, without many requirements, while 
Education Ministry is making it increasingly much more difficult for a regular 
secular to open. This is clearly a policy that favors religious education. As a 
result, many times parents are forced to send their children to a religious 
school. (Karataş, 2018) 
        In sum, during Erdogan years, major changes took place in education 
provided. First of all, religious courses increased for secular schools. Also, 
Imam Hatips receive much more funding by the state than the regular ones 
and their number increases dramatically. Secular regular schools are being 
turned into Imam Hatips and the government attempts to increase the 
number of students in these schools as much as possible. AKP claims that 
they don’t force anyone to study to an Imam Hatip and that they just make 
these schools available in order to cover the high demand for them but the 
truth is different: Imam Hatips aren’t a popular choice when applying to 
schools and the proof is that many of them remain vacant. Also, these 
establishments are highly conservative: Almost half of the teaching hours are 
about Quran and Islam, mixed classes are a taboo for these schools, many 
girls, even really young ones, wear the veil and scientific achievements like 
Evolution Theory are considered unacceptable. According to all these facts, it 
is clear that Erdogan and AKP want the population to study to these schools 
and receive Islamic education. 
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Headline: Mixed education violates rights. Yeni Akit is a pro AKP newspaper.  
Source: http://haber.sol.org.tr/toplum/gericiler-durmuyor-karma-egitim-hak-gaspiymis-
173333 
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Photos of Imam Hatip students. Boys and girls are separated. Girls, even the really young 
ones, wear the headscarf. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
82 
 
g. Alevi community and their rights 
 When the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002, one of its 
main goals was to tackle social exclusion. Erdogan had criticized the secularism that 
Kemal Ataturk brought to the Turkish Republic, calling it incomplete, and promised 
that he and the other AKP officials will create a society that would be truly secular, 
where the enmity against religion that the Kemalist establishment brought would be 
lifted and everyone, regardless of the religion they practice, would be able to live 
freely. In other words, they were promising a society where no social group would 
be excluded. So, because this research assesses if secularism in Turkey is changing, it 
is essential to review the status of whether Erdogan kept his promise: Did he allow 
the different social groups to be integrated into the society with equal rights? It is 
essential to report on this matter too because secular countries do not favor any 
particular social or religious groups, all people are considered to be equal citizens. 
The focus here is the largest group than lives in Turkey, Alevis. 
 Kemal Ataturk and the new ideology that he created, which formed the new 
Turkish state, this modernization and secularism that he brought didn’t create a 
society where everyone, every social and religious group would be able to live 
equally but created many groups of others who were second rate citizens. The most 
marginalized were Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslim minorities. Alevis were maybe the 
largest of these groups. They could be assimilated into the body politic but only if 
they denied their ethnic and religious origins. In other words, if they would abandon 
their ethnic and religious identity, then they would enjoy the rights that a Turkish 
citizen has. Full citizenship and full rights would be given only to Turkish Sunni 
Muslims that would embrace the secularist policies of the Kemalist regime. All the 
others were facing different levels of social exclusion.  (Öktem, 2011, pp. 6,26) 
 Most Alevis are ethnically Turks but in the group also the majority of Arabs 
that live in Turkey, Azeri and a small portion of Kurds are included. Sometimes they 
are confused with Shi’ites because they have some common beliefs and religious 
practices like the veneration of the Imam Ali and observance of the holy month of 
Muharrem, but in reality they are a different religion and culture. Alevism is a belief 
system that has Shamanistic elements that existed before the Islam and Zoroastrian 
elements as well as Sufi influences. They do not visit mosques, don’t pray many 
times each day like Sunni Muslim do and they have meeting houses which they call 
Cem evleri, which are used for socialization and not for religious purposes. Despite 
their intellectuals claiming that they are not Muslims, the Turkish state recognizes 
them as Muslims. Also, some Alevis claim that Alevism isn’t a religion but a group 
identity. They don’t have a systematic theology, no holy books and don’t follow 
shari’a tradition. For them, like the Sufis, religion is an esoteric experience. 
(Larrabee, 2008, pp. 20-21) 
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 Alevis are geographically spread throughout Turkey and are one of the 
largest, if not the largest, non-Sunni communal groups in the country. There isn’t a 
consensus regarding their actual number, reports range from 5 million to 25. So, it is 
best to assume that the truth lies somewhere in between. The Alevi identity is one 
that has been shared across members of a particular group that share the same 
culture, moral values, rituals and collective emotions. This identity has been 
maintained for centuries through an endogamous practice in rural context. These 
unique rituals and cultural practices that Alevis share have played important role for 
the maintenance of their identity. (KÖSE, 2010 , p. 144) 
 Alevis for centuries, during the Ottoman period, were prosecuted, oppressed, 
and discriminated against by the central governments. The Alevi identity and culture 
were either denied recognition or assimilated into the population majority, which 
was the Sunni identity. For this reason, when Kemal Ataturk came to power and 
began changing the country and reforming it, Alevis supported him and embraced 
the secularization reforms, they were considered to be citizens loyal to the founding 
principles of the Turkish Republic, in particular secularism. They accepted Ataturk’s 
policies because with the arrival of the secular Republic the ties to Sunni Islam, 
which was recognized as the state religion, were cut off. They also hoped that the 
discrimination against them would end. That’s why Alevis were often portrayed as 
defenders of secularism, accepted Ataturk as the most important politician in 
modern history and were against religious fundamentalism. (KÖSE, 2010 , p. 145), 
(Larrabee, 2008, p. 21) 
 Despite their support, Alevis were discriminated against by the Kemalist 
establishment too. Ankara welcomed this support but the government never trusted 
them. Like the Ottoman regime, they either ignored them or attempted to assimilate 
them into the Sunni majority to control them despite the majority of them being 
Turkish speakers. Despite the secular reforms, Sunni Islam remained the defining 
characteristic of the Turkish state and the Alevis were the others, a different, 
outsider group.  (Öktem, 2011, p. 34) The Turkish state never recognized them 
officially and their unique culture and lifestyle wasn’t accepted. There were legal and 
institutional barriers against their organizations and, on the social level, cultural 
biases against them prevailed. (KÖSE, 2010 , p. 145) Sometimes these biases 
escalated and led to massacres: On 19 December 1978 a mob made up by Islamists 
and Nationalist action members in the city of Maras attacked them because they 
didn’t believe in the Islamic faith, killed around 100 Alevis and destroyed many of 
their buildings and associations. Another massacre took place in the city of Sivas, 
where 35 Alevis were killed as well as in Istanbul on 1996, were many Alevis 
protested and clashed with the police. Security forces used live ammo and around 17 
people lost their lives. (Öktem, 2011, pp. 52-53, 96-99) 
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 The Alevvi issue is a very complicated one and this is because there is a wide 
range of disagreements inside their community about many social and political 
issues, for instance the definition of Alevism itself. They agree though on something: 
The need to seek public recognition of their identity and institutions as well as 
acknowledgement of the grievances caused by the Kemalist establishment. (KÖSE, 
2010 , p. 144) 
 In general, Alevi intellectuals and community leaders are secular in their 
lifestyles. They mostly support the Republican People’s Party, the one that Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk found despite the problematic relationship they have with the 
country’s secular establishment. They also have been skeptical towards Political 
Islam actors, for instance in the July 2007 parliamentary and Presidential election the 
Alevi Cem Foundation leader, İzzettin Doğan, called the Alevis to support the CHP 
and other secular parties because, as he said, AKP has an Islamization agenda. 
(Larrabee, 2008, p. 22) They were anxious of the idea that the President and the 
Prime Minister being Islamists. (Abdullah Gul was one of the candidates for the next 
President of Turkey) Alevis were genuinely concerned about AKP’s conservative 
policies. They also participated in the Gezi Park protests: They were very active 
during the protests which has shown their alienation from the dominant Sunni 
majority and their frustration with the Erdogan government because the third 
Bosporus bridge was named after the Sultan Yavuz Sultan Selim, considered by the 
Alevis as being responsible for the killing of tens of thousands of Alevis in the early 
part of the sixteenth century. (rosaTi, 2015, p. 161), (Öktem, 2011, pp. 152-153) 
 After AKP come to power in 2002 it has introduced a number of reforms to 
democratize Turkey’s political system. Alevi community expected that part of these 
reforms would be about them: Some of them expected AKP to alleviate their 
position, do something about their rights and recognize them. But soon they were 
disappointed. Among the 363 parliamentary members that got elected with AKP no 
one was an Alevi. The new Prime Minister, Recep Tayip Erdogan didn’t refer to them 
or to the problems they were facing in his public speeches. In general, AKP officials 
didn’t attempt to engage with any Alevi representatives or Alevi civil society 
institutions. The AKP party program didn’t include any policies about the Alevi issue 
and in general, during the first years of AKP government there was no improvement 
for Alevis’ life in Turkey. The Alevi social, political and identity-based claims were 
completely ignored. As was the case with the previous governments, they were 
feeling socially, politically and economically discriminated against and marginalized 
by the governing party. (KÖSE, 2010 , p. 147) 
 In general, Alevis’ demands are the following: 1) Maintenance of their 
identity in modern, urban social context. 2) They want their identity to be recognized 
as a legitimate part of the Turkish society as an equal to other social groups. 3) They 
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also want the state to allocate material resources for their institutions and 4) to 
acknowledge the traumas and victimhood that they suffered in the past. They also 
fight for guarantees that would prevent the past traumatic experiences from 
happening again. (KÖSE, 2010 , p. 150) 
 After winning elections for the second time, in 2007, the AKP government 
decided to include the Alevi issue in its agenda. This initiative is known as the Alevi 
opening and is the first serious effort to tackle the identity-based discontents of the 
people that belong to this group. Of course, this step is part of AKP’s broader policy 
of “democratic opening, whose goal is to tackle the problems of the many different 
identity groups that reside in Turkey. (Some other groups are the Kurds, the Roma 
people and the non-Muslim religious minorities) The general objective of this 
“democratic opening” is to reconcile the marginalized segments of the Turkish 
society with the state and to integrate them into the society. (KÖSE, 2010 , p. 143) 
 With this “Alevi opening” AKP has initially shown some conciliatory moves. It 
was the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic that state officials have 
acknowledged the victimhood and traumatic experiences of Alevis. The Minister of 
Culture, representing his government, has given a verbal apology for the oppressions 
and direct violence that they suffered from the authorities.  Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
himself stated that he is committed to accommodate their requests and he 
acknowledged that they were victims of discrimination and atrocities in the past. 
Also, the Alevi leaders and their associations have been recognized by the AKP 
government and there were talks during that time about legal reforms in order to 
create the legal framework in order for Alevis to be recognized and integrated into 
the Turkish society. This was the first time that such a policy was formed and it is a 
new approach for Turkish governments. High-ranking AKP politicians and statesmen, 
some of them even being the President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan, 
made many symbolic yet important gestures. (KÖSE, 2010 , pp. 146-147) Also, the 
early steps of AKP’s Alevi engagement policy included the nomination and election of 
parliament members Reha Çamuroğlu and İbrahim Yiğit, who are known in the public 
sphere to be Alevis. (KÖSE, 2010 , p. 148) Even the ultra-nationalist far-right party 
MHP, widely known as Grey Wolves, formulated a plan, which was compatible with 
AKP’s policies, for the addression of Alevis’ demands and their inclusion in the 
society. 10 (KÖSE, 2010 , p. 157) 
 Many Alevi leaders responded positively to these new policies but in general 
their community remains skeptical about them and their previous historical 
                                                          
10
  The plan that MHP prepared included: 1. Allocation of budget to cemevis, 2. Representation of 
Alevis within the Diyanet, 3. Opening of government-funded Alevi research centers and institutes, 4. 
Public broadcast of informative productions about Alevi culture on Alevi special days on official state 
TV, the TRT, 5. Representation and teaching of Alevi culture and beliefs in religion classes (KÖSE, 2010 
, p. 157) 
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experiences are to blame. Actually, a large percentage of them believe that this 
policy was nothing more than an attempt by the AKP to ‘Sunnificate’ them. In other 
words, they don’t trust the governing party. (KÖSE, 2010 , p. 148) 
 The softening of the state’s stance towards them along with reforms induced 
by the EU resulted to more lively public sphere for Alevis. Now they have numerous 
radio and TV stations, journals, online portals and their special buildings and 
institutions are now more visible. They never have been as visible and present in the 
public sphere as they are now. But leaders of the Alevi community state that their 
long standing requests have been completely ignored. According to Kerem Oktem, 
AKP doesn’t follow a serious policy in order to stop the discrimination towards 
Alevis, its policy makers just want to take advantage of them, earn their sympathy 
and their votes. (Öktem, 2008) 
 Despite these movements of good will, Alevis’ lives weren’t substantially 
improved. Still they aren’t recognized by the state as a minority and a different 
religious group despite being the largest religious minority in Turkey. For years they 
have been asking for official recognition by the state, to enjoy the amenities that 
other religious group do (for instance they want their official worship places, Cem 
evleri, to be officially recognized and to receive subsidies to cover their expenditure, 
like all the other religious minorities do) as well as the recognition of their religious 
leaders and their recruitment as civil servants but to no avail.  Turkish Courts 
overruled their case claiming that Alevism isn’t a religion and that they don’t have 
the right to receive state subsidies. Also, Alevis appealed to the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg. One of their main points was that their children 
are forced to receive Sunni Islamic education at schools. The latter decided that they 
"were subjected to a difference in treatment for which there was no objective and 
reasonable justification." The ECHR's Grand Chamber ruled by 12 votes to five that 
Alevis' right to freedom of religion had been violated, while voting 16 to one that the 
religious group was the subject of discrimination. In addition, recently the Turkey’s 
Supreme Court of Appeals decided that the state should cover their electricity bills. 
However, to the time of writing this research, November 2018,  Erdogan hasn’t 
addressed their demands yet. (Erdemir, 2018), (Hallam, 2016) 
 Summing up, if AKP officials had addressed the Alevis’ problems , who are 
one of the larger if not the largest religious groups in Turkey counting more than 10 
million, and were successful in their integration into the society, then that would be 
a step forward in the secularization process. A society that accepts every ethnic or 
religious group without discrimination and provides full citizen rights is a truly 
secular one. Of course, there had been some gestures of good will towards the 
minority but as it seems they just aimed to attract them as voters and they only 
remember them when elections were close. However, despite promising a 
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democratic society that doesn’t discriminate, AKP and Erdogan delivered a Sunni 
Islam dominated state, where AKP actors, as it has been established, try to impose 
Sunni Islam’s morals and lifestyle to everyone. Of course, Alevis haven’t been 
recognized officially by the state and their demands for respect of their heritage and 
their rights haven’t been met to the day of the writing of this dissertation. This is 
another clear sign that secularism doesn’t gain ground but it withdraws, as the Sunni 
identity is the dominant one in Turkey nowadays.  
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h. Does Erdogan have an Islamization agenda? 
 Recep Tayip Erdogan was claiming that his party is a conservative democratic 
one, one that would allow the formerly repressed Muslims to freely live their lives 
according to the religion’s teachings as well as to create a truly secular society, 
where everyone would be able to coexist, no matter their religious beliefs. In reality, 
what he did was to make Sunni Islam the dominant belief and lifestyle in Turkey. The 
Diyanet, which is the institution that administers religious education and the 
mosques, has an increased importance and influence and this is a policy designed by 
AKP and Erdogan himself. Diyanet also, whose members are conservative Muslims, 
recently started taking advantage of its newfound political power, and has begun 
issuing orders to introduce elements of sharia law to the Turkish society. The fact 
that Erdogan and AKP in general support the Diyanet is a clue that they are in favor 
of their very conservative views. 
 Also, AKP’s education policy is very important if we want to understand 
Erdogan’s goals and vision for the future Turkish society. As discussed, Imam Hatip 
schools are being promoted, they are being funded with billions of dollars, much 
more than the regular schools, they have increased in number and tend to increase 
even more despite the low demand for them and education officials try to increase 
the students attending these schools as much as possible by altering the high school 
entry system. Also, AKP slowly but steadily converts regular public schools to Imam 
Hatips and they fund the currently operating secular schools with much less money 
than the former ones, resulting in a shortage of secular schools in some 
municipalities. Parents are forced to either send their children to religious schools, 
pay very large fees in order for their children to study in private secular schools or 
send them to technical occupational schools. Almost half of the teaching hours in 
Imam Hatips are about Islam and the Quran, which means that children’ views will 
be completely affected by Islamic education they receive. Summing up, it is clear 
that Erdogan wants future children to be conservative pious Muslims and that’s why 
there have been so many changes in the education system in Turkey in the last 15 
years.  
 A secular society is one that doesn’t have a dominant religious or ethnic 
group at its center. Despite promising a true secular society and democratization, 
Erdogan didn’t deliver: The Alevis, which is the largest religious group in Turkey that 
has over 10.000.000 members, still isn’t recognized by the state; It doesn’t accept 
their religion, they don’t receive funds and they don’t have rights as all minorities do. 
This is another clear sign that secularism doesn’t gain ground but it withdraws, as 
the Sunni identity is the dominant one in Turkey nowadays. 
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 Also, Erdogan and AKP politicians don’t accept difference and lifestyles 
different than the Islamic ones and they try to interfere on Turkish citizens’ way of 
life. For instance, they increased the tax for alcoholic drinks trying to disincentive 
everyone from consuming them, advice women to now wear provocative clothing, 
prosecute those who insult Islam in social media and in general they promote, as an 
official policy, the conservative Islamic way of life.  
 All the above measures and policies hint that AKP politicians and Erdogan 
himself, who has superpowers, controls everything in the country and is the true 
mastermind behind AKP’s policies, want to Islamize the society, based on the Sunni 
version of Islam. They claim that what are they doing is to alleviate the position of 
the religious Muslims, who were feeling repressed by the Kemalist establishment but 
in truth, what is happening in Turkey right now is completely different. Not only the 
Islamists’ way of life dominates, but they don’t peacefully coexist with secularists. 
Now, the latter are the repressed ones, who feel that their lifestyle is threatened by 
Islamists who gain ground.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
6. Conclusions 
 As it has already been established, Turkey got turned into a secular and 
modern country because Mustafa Kemal Ataturk believed that that way Turkey 
would reach the cultural level of the developed Western World and achieve 
greatness. In order to achieve this goal, he imposed a secular and modern lifestyle to 
the Turkish population, a move that was radical for the time. A large part of the 
population was feeling repressed by these changes and they wanted to return to the 
old ways of life, where the Islamic values were the dominant ones. Islamists 
mobilized politically, having as their head Necmettin Erbakan, who found the Milli 
Gorus movement, which gave rise to the Political Islam. He succeeded entering the 
Parliament and even becoming Prime Minister but he wasn’t able to change the 
Turkish state. The Kemalist establishment and military officers always stopped him in 
order to preserve the state that Ataturk had created. Erbakan and Islamic actors in 
general had found many political parties but all of them, one way or another, always 
got dissolved by the intervention of kemalist establishment.  
 The big change happened with the rise of the Justice and Development Party, 
the one that Recep Tayip Erdogan, Turkey’s current powerful man, founded. He 
declared that he abandoned the old, conservatıve and radıcal ways of Polıtıcal Islam 
actors and promised a liberal, truly democratic, tolerant and secular society, where 
everyone would be able to live freely and where no one would feel repressed, no 
matter their religion as well as he promised to stop the repression and alienation 
that pious Muslims felt. Secularists were feeling threatened though because they 
believed that Recep Tayip Erdogan had an Islamization agenda, which he repeatedly 
denied. Western countries believed that Erdogan was a moderate Islamist that 
would reform the country, liberalize it and that Turkey would become the example 
that all the other Islamic countries should follow. But, after years passed and 
Erdogan consolidated his power, things changed for the worse. Erdogan abandoned 
democratic procedures and made an authoritarian turn, seizing every power in his 
hands. Also, he stopped reforms that aimed to make Turkey a candidate country for 
joining the EU, the vast majority of media are under his control and opposing voices 
are immediately suppressed. Now he can do whatever he wants. If he really has an 
Islamization agenda, like the former political Islam actors did, now he has the power 
to do so since no one can stop him, checks and balances in Turkey are non-existent 
right now. 
 His policies didn’t assure secularists that he doesn’t have an Islamization 
agenda. First of all, the Islamist lifestyle is imposed to the society with measures like 
prohibition of alcohol and prosecuting those that insult Islam in social media. In 
addition, AKP increased the Directorate of Religious Affairs’ role. First of all, they 
increased its funding and its personnel as well as they allowed it to get mixed with 
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politics. In addition, its personnel are mostly conservative Islamists that believe in 
Sharia law. The greatly increased influence of this institution, thanks to AKP party 
and Erdogan, allow it to influence society and they have the means to do it, such as 
radio and television programs. 
 Assessing education policy points that the goal of Erdogan is to have as many 
children as possible study in Imam Hatips, which are religious schools that formerly 
served as training schools for future Muslim clergy. These establishments have 
increased drammatically, receive much greater funding than regular schools and AKP 
officials turn regular schools into Imam Hatips. As a result, in many municipalities, it 
is hard for parents to find regular schools to send their children to in order to study 
and they are forced to pay for private education or to send them to occupational 
schools.  In addition, the new curriculum aims to send as many children as possible 
to these schools, where almost half of the teaching hours are about Quran and the 
life of the Prophet. These children will attend much less science classes than the 
previous generations and will be conservative Islamists when they grow up. AKP 
states that they don’t force anyone to study there, they claim that they just open 
many Imam Hatips in order to meet the, according to them, high demand. But in 
reality, these educational establishments aren’t popular, a large percentage of them 
remain vacant.  
 In general, AKP’s policies show that they want the society in Turkey to 
change, to become an Islamic and more conservative one, where Islamic values and 
teachings of the Quran would be really important for the society. But, before an 
answer is given to the question this current research tries to answer, whether 
secularism in Turkey is in a process of change, first it is necessary to define 
secularism. If secularism is a principle where a state is equidistant from any religion, 
ethnicity or social group then the answer is that Turkey has never been a secular 
state to begin with. It was a country where there was a dominant religion and 
ethnicity, Sunni Islam and Turks where the ones that were dominant, the prestigious 
ones in a manner of speaking and the other ethnicities and religious groups were 
disadvantaged and discriminated against. If, one the other hand, secularism means 
that religion and the state are separate, religion’s teachings and its holy laws aren’t 
important for the society but is only something personal for each individual and 
policy making isn’t affected by it, then Turkey was made a secular country and 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was the one that made it happen. According to this way of 
thinking, today’s government follows an agenda that is changing the society and is 
undermining secularism. In other words, secular state is in a process of change, 
secular state during the AKP years has started to change as the religion is in the 
political agenda and is the center of many of AKP policies. In the past, the religious 
and conservatives were feeling repressed because of the dominating secularists. 
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Now tides have turned and the roles have been switched. The Islamists are the 
dominating ones and secularists feel alienated inside their own country. 
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